Chap13.htm
Although the armored phase of COBRA was about to
begin, the infantry on the morning of 26 July still had much to do. While
getting out of the paths of the armored columns, they had to broaden the penetration
achieved after the big bombardment and insure its permanence. This was no minor assignment; the infantry
found that, even though the Germans were considerably disorganized, enemy
morale had not been "shaken to the point where the individual soldier will
not carry out his mission, which still is to defend every inch of ground and
inflict ... as many casualties as possible." (See Map V.)
German Reaction
The first report to give German higher headquarters
any picture of what had happened after the COBRA bombardment revealed that the
Americans had penetrated the main line of defense. German commanders learned at
1600, 25 July, that American troops were south of the P6riers‑St. Lo
highway, in Montreuil, and on the road to Marigny.3 Choltitz immediately
committed part of his LXXXIV Corps reserve, a reinforced regiment of the .353d
Division. From an assembly area south of Periers, the regiment moved eastward
to secure la Chapelle‑en‑juger and thereby seal off the
penetration. Not long afterward, Hausser committed part of his Seventh Army
reserve, a regiment of the 275th Division, which, from its assembly area near
Canisy, also moved toward la Chapelle‑en‑juger. Thus, Choltitz and
Hausser, acting on the same idea, sent two converging columns to deny the Americans
the vital road network controlled by the village in the center of the attack
zone.
Hausser hoped that retention of la Chapelle‑en‑juger
would permit him to re‑establish a main line of resistance eastward to
Hebecrevon, but he was unaware of the extent of the disaster that had overcome
his troops. His command channels had been disrupted by the COBRA bombing and
were saturated with overdue messages. Counting on the 5th Parachute Division,
which controlled one regiment, to hold its positions near the Taute River and
prevent the Americans from broadening their breach, he was not disappointed,
for the paratroopers checked any genuine advance by the 330th Infantry. But
Hausser also counted on the 352d Division (under II Parachute Corps) to hold
the west bank of the Vire River and prevent an American penetration near
Hebecrevon. What he did not know was that Panzer
Lehr had lost the bulk of its organic infantry, at least fourteen of its
assault guns, and ten of its few remaining tanks; that Kampfgruppe Heinz and the other regiment of the 5th Parachute Division, both attached to
Panzer Lehr, had been demolished; and
that the regiment of the 275th Division moving
up from Canisy was about to be crushed by American fighter‑bombers and
infantry. The result was an open left flank for the 352d Division, and in that condition the unit was simply too weak
to hold Hebecrevon, much less seal off a penetration.
Ignorant of these developments and of the loss of
Hebecrevon, which opened the route to St. Gilles, the German army and corps
commanders in the Cotentin exuded optimism on the morning of 26 July. Choltitz
committed the remainder of the 353d
Division eastward toward the Montreuil‑Marigny line to slow the
efforts of the 9th Division. Hausser, while waiting for the destroyed and
virtually nonexistent regiment of the 275th
Division to move northwest from Canisy, decided to launch a counterattack
with the company of tanks and the company of infantry of the 2d SS Panzer Division that he still had
in army reserve. He committed this force in the Marigny area, where it met
American armor and infantry.
Kluge, who had been diverted to the Caen sector on
25 July by the Canadian attack, thought the situation in the Cotentin might be
worse than his subordinates suspected. He suggested that Hausser withdraw the
left of the LXXXIV Corps slightly in
order to shorten the front. This would make
it possible to disengage the entire 2d
SS Panzer Division for a counterattack. By this time, however, U.S. troops
on the Cotentin west coast were attacking and tying down the LXXXIV Corps left. Hausser could not
disengage the entire panzer division; by evening he had succeeded in freeing
only one tank battalion and one infantry battalion from the battle. He moved
these units eastward toward the breakthrough sector.4
Hausser's difficulty with the panzer division was
only part of the story. By late afternoon on 25 July he had counted seven
distinct American penetrations of his Lessay‑St. L6 defensive line. He
had also received Bayerlein's report that Panzer
Lehr had practically no infantry left and that the division was about to
cease to exist as an organized unit. Hausser therefore proposed a general
withdrawal to Coutances of those LXXXIV
Corps units in the coastal sector of the Cotentin. Still hoping that la
Chapelle‑enjuger was not entirely lost, he thought of manning an outpost
line between that village and Geffosses, the latter near the west coast.
Suspecting that a withdrawal might turn into a rout,
Kluge insisted on restraint. He ordered Hausser to prepare a main line of
resistance from Pirou through Millires to Wriers in order to keep the Geffosses‑St.
Sauveur‑Lendelin‑Marigny road in German hands. He instructed
Hausser to place all his available personnel on the front (rather than
echeloning his defense in depth) in order to prevent immediately further
American advances. He also repeated an American penetration near Hebecrevon.
What he did not know was that Panzer Lehr
had lost the bulk of its organic infantry, at least fourteen of its assault
guns, and ten of its few remaining tanks; that Kampfgruppe Heinz and the other regiment of the 5th Parachute Division, both attached to
Panzer Lehr, had been demolished; and
that the regiment of the 275th Division moving
up from Canisy was about to be crushed by American fighter‑bombers and
infantry. The result was an open left flank for the 352d Division, and in that condition the unit was simply too weak
to hold H&6crevon, much less seal off a penetration.
Ignorant of these developments and of the loss of
Hedecrevon, which opened the route to St. Gilles, the German army and corps
commanders in the Cotentin exuded optimism on the morning of 26 July. Choltitz
committed the remainder of the 353d
Division eastward toward the Montreuil‑Marigny line to slow the
efforts of the 9th Division. Hausser, while waiting for the destroyed and
virtually nonexistent regiment of the 275th
Division to move northwest from Canisy, decided to launch a counterattack
with the company of tanks and the company of infantry of the 2d SS Panzer Division that he still had
in army reserve. He committed this force in the Marigny area, where it met
American armor and infantry.
Kluge, who had been diverted to the Caen sector on
25 July by the Canadian attack, thought the situation in the Cotentin might be
worse than his subordinates suspected. He sup, ested that Hausser withdraw the
left of the LXXXIV Corps slightly in
order to shorten the front. This would make it possible to disengage the entire
2d SS Panzer Division for a
counterattack. By this time, however, U.S. troops on the Cotentin west coast
were attacking and tying down the LXXXIV
Corps left. Hausser could not disengage the entire panzer division; by
evening he had succeeded in freeing only one tank battalion and one infantry
battalion from the battle. He moved these units eastward toward the
breakthrough sector.
Hausser's difficulty with the panzer division was
only part of the story. By late afternoon on 25 July he had counted seven
distinct American penetrations of his Lessay‑St. Lo defensive line. He
had also received Bayerlein's report that Panzer
Lehr had practically no infantry left and that the division was about to
cease to exist as an organized unit. Hausser therefore proposed a general
withdrawal to Coutances of those LXXXIV
Corps units in the coastal sector of the Cotentin. Still hoping that la
Chapelle‑enjuger was not entirely lost, he thought of manning an outpost
line between that village and Geffosses, the latter near the west coast.
Suspecting that a withdrawal might turn into a rout,
Kluge insisted on restraint. He ordered Hausser to prepare a main line of
resistance from Pirou through Millieres to Periers in order to keep the
Geffosses‑St. Sauveur‑Lendelin‑Marigny road in German hands.
He instructed Hausser to place all his available personnel on the front (rather
than echeloning his defense in depth) in order to prevent immediately further
American advances. He also repeated a request, which he had been making to OKW
since 13 July, that OKW permit the 9th
Panzer Division to be brought up from southern France to reinforce the Seventh Army at once.
Penetration
On the morning of 26 July, the situation from the American point of view did not
appear very bright. On the right of VII Corps, the 33oth Infantry, which was to
safeguard the flank of the COBRA main effort by cutting the Periers‑St.
Lo highway, securing a road intersection, and turning gradually westward, was
hopeful of accomplishing its missions early on 26 July, for the tank destroyer fire that had been harassing the
regiment from Marchesieux ceased. But
it soon became evident that the German paratroopers in opposition were as
determined as ever. Not until late in the evening was the 330th Infantry able
to cross the Periers‑St. Lo highway, and even then the Germans continued
to deny the regiment its crossroads objective.
Instructed to permit the principal COBRA armored
column to pass through his 9th Division zone, General Eddy on 26 July had to clear both enemy
troops and his own from the Marigny road.
He had to prevent the enemy from cutting the road
and thereby blunting the main COBRA thrust. Restricted to a narrow zone of
operations and facing German forces unharmed by the COBRA bombardment, General
Eddy maneuvered his units so that the 9th Division by the end of the day was
two and a half miles south of the Periers‑St. Lo highway and almost two
miles west of the Marigny road. The division had sustained almost 200
casualties and had captured somewhat fewer prisoners. Although General Eddy had
prevented his own troops from hampering an armored column moving south and had
kept the Marigny road clear of enemy fire to the extent of his penetration, he
faced the opposition of the 353d
Division, which, in trying to retake la Chapelle‑en‑juger,
threatened the VII Corps right flank.
The 8th Infantry of the 4th Division took la
Chapelle‑en‑juger in the early morning of 26 July. Combat patrols had entered the village during the night, but
the village crossroads was not secured until morning. Continuing south, the regiment moved slowly, clearing isolated
enemy groups. Commitment of the reserve battalion in the afternoon provided
enough added weight for a three mile surge that overran part of the 353d Division and put Panzer Lehr artillery units to flight.
Early that evening the leading troops engaged what seemed like the remnants of
a German battalion, captured about a company of miscellaneous troops, and
destroyed or dispersed the others. The regiment cut the Coutances‑St. Lo
highway and at the end of the day was about five miles south of the COBRA line
of departure.
On the corps left, the 3oth Division had not only to
protect the COBRA flank but also to permit an American armored column to pass
through the division zone for exploitation beyond St. Gilles. Enemy artillery
fire from what was estimated to be one medium and three light battalions, as
well as from several 88‑mm. guns, checked any real advance during the
morning of 26 July; but counterbattery missions delivered by the artillery
units of the 30th Division, the VII Corps, and the XIX Corps produced the
desired effect early that afternoon. As the division began to advance against
diminishing artillery and mortar fire, an armored column passed through the
division zone and drove toward St. Gilles."
The 117th Infantry, attacking toward the loop of the
Vire River, was stopped at a steep ravine where a well‑positioned line
held by part of the 352d Division was
supported by II Parachute Corps artillery
firing from the high ground south of St. Lo. The regiment made five different
attempts to overcome the resistance, but without success. Though close support
by fighter‑bombers might have aided the attack, General Hobbs was
reluctant to request it because he feared a repetition of bombing errors.
Accepting the apprehension as valid, General Collins did not press for the
employment of tactical air. Not until evening, after a heavy 4.2‑inch
mortar preparation that coincided with a German withdrawal, did the regiment
cross the ravine and move quickly to the entrance of the loop, less than two
miles west of St. Lo.
The 119th Infantry, the other assault regiment,
moved rapidly in the afternoon for two miles south of Hebecrevon and cut the
Coutances‑St. Lo highway. Given a new mission at once‑cutting the
Canisy‑St. Lo highway two miles to the south‑the regiment was half
way to its objective by nightfall. At this point the leading troops of the 30th
Division were more than three miles south of the pre‑COBRA Positions.
By late afternoon of 26 July, General Collins no
longer doubted that his forces had achieved a clear penetration of the enemy
defenses. Deeming that the situation demanded speed rather than caution, he
told the infantry divisions to continue their attacks through the night.
General
Collins' directive coincided with a German order to make a slight withdrawal.
During the night of 26 July the German units west of the Taute River‑those
comprising the left of the LXXXIV Corps‑withdrew slightly along the coast
and took up a new line of defense anchored on Periers and Marechesieux. The 6th Parachute Regiment passed into the
corps reserve at St. Sauveur‑Lendelin. just to the right of the corps
boundary, the 352d Division of the II
Parachute Corps, already outflanked, also
withdrew from the loop of the Vire and along the west bank of the Vire River‑in
order to try to re‑establish contact with Panzer Lehr. This could be
no more than a hope, for by that time there was virtually no organized
resistance between the 352d and the 5th Parachute Divisions, though the
German higher commands did not seem to know it.
Although the 330th Infantry on the extreme right
flank of the VII Corps again struck stonewall resistance, all the other
infantry units advanced during the night of 26 July. The 9th Division secured a
road junction of local importance. The 8th Infantry of the 4th Division,
leaving its vehicles and antitank guns behind, moved unencumbered for several
miles, outflanked both the Panzer Lehr artillery
and the remaining reserves of the regiment of the 275th Division at Marigny, and, at dawn, hastened the flight of a
withdrawing enemy column. Some troops of the 30th Division moved easily into
the loop of the Vire River while others cut the Canisy‑St. Lo road.
Except on the extreme right flank of the VII Corps
where the 330th Infantry was denied for the third day the crossroads on the
Nriers‑St. Lo highway that constituted its original objective,
developments after daylight on 27 July indicated that the infantry was nearing
fulfillment Of its COBRA aims. The 9th Division, in a regimental attack against
some 200 Germans, who were on a small ridge and were supported by four tanks
and several antitank guns, destroyed the bulk of this force and dispersed the
remainder. The 4th Division sent its
reconnaissance troop ahead to screen a rapid advance. Strong resistance from enemy positions hastily erected during
the night melted away. The 8th Infantry
cut the Carantilly‑Canisy road and proceeded to a point more than
seven miles south of the Nriers‑St. Lo highway. To clear small pockets of
bypassed Germans, General Barton committed portions of the 12th Infantry, which
had been in division reserve since the commencement of COBRA. Contingents of
the 30th Division moved all the way into the loop of the Vire River and
established physical contact with the 35th Division at the St. Lo bridge. Other
units secured the two Vire River bridges on the main roads south of St. Lo.
General Hobbs committed his reserve regiment, the 120th, which drove south
along the Vire River for almost six miles against little opposition.
"This thing has busted wide open," General
Hobbs exulted. He was right. Evidence of German disintegration was plentiful. Some
German soldiers were walking into command posts to surrender; other were
fleeing south or across the Vire River.
On the morning of 28 July, the 330th Infantry at
last was able to move against virtually no resistance to rejoin its parent
unit, the 83d Division. In the 9th Division sector, only an occasional round of
artillery or mortar fire was falling by noon; small arms fire had ceased.
Having fulfilled its COBRA assignment, the 9th Division passed into reserve for
rest and reconstitution. The 4th Division mopped up isolated enemy remnants and
prepared to move south in a new operation. The 30th Division, advancing south
along the west bank of the Vire River, passed from control of the VII Corps.
For the infantry units that had run interference,
Operation COBRA had ended. General Hobbs perhaps typified infantry sentiment
when he stated, "We may be the spearhead that broke the camel's
back." There was no doubt that the
camel's back was broken and that the infantry had helped break it. But the
armored forces of Operation COBRA also played their part.
Commitment of Armor
For the Americans, the critical day of the COBRA
operation was 26 July, when General Collins had gambled. He committed some of
his forces assembled for the exploitation before the situation was
unquestionably ripe for an exploitation maneuver. Specifically, the infantry
had not captured the towns of Marigny and St. Gilles, road centers considered
prerequisite to an uninhibited exploitation by mobile armored reserves.
The fact that COBRA on 26 July was to become a three‑corps
offensive actually made it impossible for General Collins to wait for the
infantry to seize Marigny and St. Gilles. The success of the larger effort
depended basically on a VII Corps breakthrough. Emphasizing this fact, General
Bradley assigned to VII Corps all the air support available on 26 July, thus
obliging Collins to step up the attack. The only way to do this was to commit
the armor.
The basic gamble involved was the possibility that
armored columns would congest the VII Corps battlefield. "The only
doubtful part of it [the original COBRA plan] to my mind," General Collins
had said two weeks earlier, "is we shouldn't count too much on fast
movement of armored divisions through this country; if we make a break‑through
it is OK but until them . . . [the armored divisions] can't move any faster
than the infantry." To minimize
congestion, General Collins called upon only part of his reserve, two armored
columns instead of the three that were ready.
The commitment of the mobile units on 26 July was
not so much the start of the exploitation as an effort to deepen the
penetration. Instead of assigning exploitation objectives, Collins told one of
the armored columns to take Marigny, the other St. Gilles. Two hundred fighter‑bombers
were to attack each town in advance of the thrusts. Only after these original infantry objectives were secured was
the true exploitation phase of COBRA to begin.
Having
expected the COBRA air bombardment to obliterate the German defenses and the infantry
to clear the routes of advance, the commanders of the mobile forces had planned
to move at least as far as Marigny and St. Gilles with reconnaissance squadrons
ahead of their main spearheads. Now a semi-administrative road march of this
type was out of the question. 'The commanders replaced their reconnaissance
units with assault troops and retained their artillery under centralized
control rather than parceling it out to subordinate combat teams.
Clearing the road to Marigny became the responsibility
of Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, who commanded the 1st Infantry Division and
the attached Combat Command B of the 3d Armored Division. Alerted on the
afternoon of 25 July to pass through the 9th Division the next day and capture
Marigny, General Huebner ordered CCB (Col. Truman E. Boudinot) and the
reinforced 18th Infantry (Col. George Smith, Jr.) to attack abreast astride the
road. Not quite certain whether the 1st Division, which had motorized its
infantry troops, was embarking on exploitation, a VII Corps staff officer in a
routine telephone call to transmit the bomb safety line remarked somewhat
facetiously that his message was unnecessary if "you are going someplace
and are going fast." General Huebner,
who commanded one of the two divisions General Eisenhower had characterized as
"tops" in the theater, was planning to go somewhere fast all
right. He hoped to take Marigny
quickly and proceed at once to exploit westward from Marigny to Coutances.
The 1st Division made its approach march to the vicinity
of the Periers‑St. Lo highway during the night of 25 July without
incident. Shortly after daybreak, 26 July, the leading units bypassed an enemy
pocket of 150 men still north of the COBRA line of departure. Leaving the
reduction of this small force to the reserve battalion of the 18th Infantry,
the advance troops drove toward Marigny.
With the combat command on the right (west) of the
road and the infantry regiment on the left, the 1st Division troops moved
cautiously against small arms fire. Bomb craters in the roads and defended
hedgerows bounding the fields were the principal deterrents to a rapid advance.
Small roadblocks also slowed the attack. Artillery and tank fire eliminated
most of the opposition, but only after the infantry components had received
heavy casualties, particularly among key personnel.
Near Marigny, the troops encountered the increasing
resistance of the 353d Division and
the two companies of the 2d SS Panzer
Division. Several Mark IV tanks and a few 75‑mm. antitank guns north
of the town halted progress early in the afternoon. Under cover of an extended
tank fire fight, CCB attempted an envelopment to the right but achieved no
success. A tactical air strike late in the afternoon enabled armored elements
to reach the northern edge of the town; the enveloping forces buttoned up for
the night about a mile west of Marigny.
The presence of American tanks in the northern
outskirts of Marigny and the abortive envelopment led the 18th Infantry to the
erroneous belief that the combat command
had taken the town. Acting on
this mistaken impression, the regiment sent a battalion to bypass the town on
the east during the evening and take high ground south of Marigny. The
battalion took some high ground shortly before midnight and reported completion
of its mission. Unfortunately, the battalion had become lost in the darkness;
not only was it on the wrong objective, its actual location was a mystery.
The belief that Marigny had been captured was one of
the factors leading to General Collins' order to continue the attacks during
the night of 26 July. Specifically, Collins instructed General Huebner to
commence his exploitation toward Coutances. To provide additional elbow room
for the 1st Division, General Collins redrew the boundary between the 1st and
9th Divisions.
General Huebner for his part dared not carry out the
order. He was not sure exactly where all his front‑line units were, for
reports of their locations and dispositions had confused his headquarters
throughout the day; he was not certain that his troops had really secured
Marigny; he was concerned by continuing resistance near Marigny; and, finally,
he feared that large‑scale movement during darkness would promote
congestion and confusion.
Still without Marigny after two days, the VII Corps
had yet to launch its main exploiting effort westward to Coutances. As
discouraging as this seemed to be the success achieved on the other flank of
the corps was quite the opposite.
On the left (east) flank, Maj. Gen. Edward H.
Brooks, commanding the 2d Armored Division, had what was essentially a
protective mission: guarding the COBRA flank on the south and southeast. Yet if
General Brooks realized that his mission was defensive in nature, he gave no
indication of it. So far as he was concerned, he was going to move. With the
22d Infantry (Col. Charles T. Lanham) attached, he was to attack in a column of
combat commands, which eventually were to split and make independent thrusts.
Brig. Gen. Maurice Rose's Combat Command A, with the 22d Infantry attached, was
to be the leading unit.29 Rose's troops were to pass through the 30th Division
zone and secure St. Gilles.
Effecting the passage of lines without difficulty,
CCA drove south early on 26 July in a single column.30 Almost immediately after
the troops crossed the Periers‑St. Lo highway, an enemy antitank gun
destroyed one Sherman, but this was a blow not soon repeated. Brooks told Rose to get moving, and Rose
complied. As the column began to roll, only scattered artillery and antitank
fire and an occasional defended hedgerow or ditch provided any genuine
resistance. When combined with the problem of bomb craters dotting the
countryside, this was nevertheless sufficient to preclude a rapid advance. In
the early afternoon a defended roadblock several hundred yards north of St.
Gilles held up progress for a short time, but tank fire and an air strike that
destroyed four Mark IV tanks and a selfpropelled gun soon eliminated the
opposition.
In midafternoon CCA rolled through St. Gilles. By
this act, the combat command launched the exploitation phase Of COBRA. There was no longer any doubt
that the German line had definitely been penetrated. The VII Corps had achieved
its breakthrough.
Limited Exploitation
South of St. Gilles, CCA of the 2d Armored Division,
with the 22d Infantry still attached, headed for its initial objective in the
exploitation: the high ground five miles beyond St. Gilles, ground commanding
an extensive network of roads leading into the COBRA zone from the east and south. There, at St. Samson‑de‑Bonfoss6,
le Mesnil--Herman and Hill 183, the armor would find good defensive positions
from which to halt a possible German counterattack from across the Vire River.
To reach the area, CCA had to pass through Canisy, not quite two miles south of
St. Gilles.
Proceeding steadily against mortar, artillery, and
antitank fire interdicting the Canisy road, CCA had more difficulty with bomb
craters, mine fields, and hedgerows than with the occasional enemy resistance.
In late afternoon General Rose reported
opposition in his zone negligible and estimated that the rear of his
column would soon clear St. Gilles.
Rose's optimism contributed materially to General Collins' decision to
continue the corps attack during the night.
Part of the reason why the opposition was negligible
lay in the clearing operations of the 30th Division. Another part lay in the
fact that the St. Gilles--Canisy road was the boundary separating the LXXXIV and II Parachute Corps sectors. Panzer
Lehr was specifically responsible for the highway. The virtual destruction
of Panzer Lehr left the road open.
The 352d Division, manning the sector
between the road and the river, was thus continually outflanked as Rose's
combat command drove down an excellent route of advance, threatened solely by
occasional flanking fire.
Only as CCA neared the first buildings in Canisy was
there any real resistance. At a railroad embankment north of Canisy where a
bombed railway overpass had tumbled across the highway, a few Germans tried to
make a stand; the combat command outflanked the position from the east and
raked the defenders with enfilading fire.
Coincidentally, dive bombers struck Canisy and set half the town ablaze.
The armor rolled through the burning town that evening.
just
beyond Canisy, General Rosesplit his command into two columns. One moved
southeastward toward St. Samson‑de‑Bonfoss6, the other southward
toward le Mesnil‑Herman. Although division headquarters assumed that the
combat command had halted for the night, Rose drove his men forward with single‑minded
purpose and determination in compliance with General Collins' and General
Brooks' orders. An hour before midnight
one column entered St. Samson‑de‑Bonfoss6 without a fight. Three
hours later the other seized the road intersection just north of le MesnilHerman.
Only then, with part of the initial objective in hand, did General Rose
sanction a halt.
The next morning, 27 July, as batteries of the 14th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion leapfrogged forward to give continuous fire support,
the combat command engaged enemy tanks and antitank guns before taking and
securing le Mensil‑Herman. Hill 183 fell during the afternoon. With that,
CCA completed its initial mission.
In two days Combat Command A ‑had lost less
than 200 men, 3 medium tanks, and 2 small trucks. Not only the weakness of the
opposition but the dispatch with which General Rose had secured his objective
had prevented higher casualties. Even so, Rose was not satisfied with his
accomplishment; he complained that the poor condition of the roads, the absence
of road bypasses, and the hedgerowed terrain had slowed his movement.
As General Rose prepared to reconnoiter in force
toward Villebaudon and Tessy‑sur‑Vire on the morning of 28 July,
word came that CCA's role in COBRA was over. The combat command and the
attached infantry regiment were soon to pass from the control of the VII Corps.
While General Rose's attack had moved smoothly
against light opposition, General Huebner had met unexpected difficulty at
Marigny on 26 July. The 1st Division, with Combat Command B of the 3d Armored
Division attached, had been unable to start the main effort of the exploitation‑its
thrust westward from Marigny to Coutances to slash across the rear of the
German troops facing north against the VIII Corps. Since the VIII Corps had
begun to exert pressure from the north on 26 July, it became vital for the 1st
Division to get to Coutances at once in order to execute the squeeze play that
was part of the basic COBRA idea.
Even though General Huebner did not possess a secure
pivot point at Marigny, he felt impelled to begin his exploitation on the
morning of 27 July. He ordered Colonel Boudinot's CCB to initiate the westward
thrust toward Coutances. In the meantime, Colonel Smith's 18th Infantry was to
attack Marigny and high ground south of the town in order to secure the road
network required for sustaining the exploitation.
Getting CCB on the way to Coutances conformed with
the original 1st Division plan, a plan devised to employ as the axis of advance
the east‑west Coutances--St. Lo highway, which passes through rolling bocage country. West of Marigny the
highway runs along the southern slope of a ridge line formed by a complex of
three hills‑the highest rising 580 feet‑a mile or so north of the
highway. This prominent terrain feature dominating the approaches to Coutances
from the north and east provided an excellent natural blocking position astride
the routes of withdrawal of the German forces facing the VIII Corps, and
together with Coutances was the 1st Division's objective.
Of the three hills forming the ridge line, the
first, five miles west of Marigny, is near Camprond. The second, two miles
farther to the west, is near Cambernon. The third is near Monthuchon. To
General Huebner the early capture of these hills was of double importance, for
they dominated also his own route of approach to Coutances.
General Huebner had selected his attached armored
command to spearhead the attack both because a rapid advance along the highway
was essential for success of the
COBRA scheme of maneuver and because the highway between Marigny and Coutances
was excellent. CCB was to seize the first objective, Camprond, then the third
objective, Monthuchon. Motorized infantry regimental combat teams of organic 1st
Division troops were to follow in column. The 18th Infantry was to relieve CCB
first at Camprond, then at Monthuchon. In turn, the reinforced 16th Infantry
(Col. Frederick W. Gibb) was to relieve the 18th at Camprond. The reinforced
26th Infantry (Col. John F. R. Seitz) was to follow secondary roads on the left
flank of the other units and seize the second objective, Cambernon. In the end,
all three infantry regiments would be lined up on the three objectives to the
rear of the German line.
After being relieved at Monthuchon, CCB had a
further mission, which was determined by the location of Monthuchon on the
north‑south Periers‑Coutances highway, one of the main escape
routes for Germans withdrawing before VIII Corps. The combat command was to be
prepared to do one of two things: if the VIII Corps had not pushed back the
Germans, CCB was to attack northward toward Periers; if the Germans were trying
to escape to the south, CCB was to proceed southwestward from Monthuchon to
high ground a mile or so north of Coutances in order to block the three main
highways leading into Coutances from
the north."
Because of the unexpected resistance at Marigny,
General Huebner changed his plan of maneuver on the morning of 27 July‑
Since continued German possession of Marigny denied the 1st Division an
adequate road net, General Huebner withheld one regiment, the 26th, in order to
reduce the hazard of traffic congestion. CCB was to secure Camprond, the first
objective. Instead of following the armor, the 18th Infantry was to capture
Marigny, then send a battalion to free the armor at Camprond. The 16th
Infantry, instead of relieving the 18th at Camprond, was to make a wider swing
to the west, echeloned to the left rear of CCB, and move all the way to the
blocking positions on the highways just north of Coutances. Meanwhile, CCB was
to attack and secure in turn all three hill objectives.
The 18th Infantry cleared Marigny on the morning of
27 July, and that afternoon two battalions attacked to the south against strong
opposition in an attempt to seize the high ground needed to secure the
town. The reserve battalion in
midafternoon moved westward along the Coutances highway to relieve CCB at
Camprond.
Early that morning CCB had lunged down the Coutances
highway.40 Spearheaded by the reconnaissance battalion and divided into three
balanced teams or task forces (a company each of medium tanks and armored
infantry), the combat command advanced with two teams abreast. Against
disorganized opposition, the attack carried four miles in four hours. Shortly
after midday the task force on the right turned to the north and struck cross‑country
for the hill near Camprond, two miles away. By midafternoon the task force ‑held
the objective.
The advance along the highway had been virtually a road
march except for casual encounters with German motorcyclists, ambulances, and
staff cars. Progress on the flanks had been more difficult for the presence of
hedgerows enabled scattered enemy groups to form hasty defenses and resist with
determination. The result was a gain on a narrow front scarcely wider than the
width of the highway.
Moving to relieve the force at Camprond, the
battalion of the 18th Infantry encountered virtually no opposition on the
Coutances highway, but when it moved off the road toward the hill small enemy
groups supported by random tanks began to cause trouble. With the help of
fighter‑bombers, the battalion gained the hill shortly before midnight.
Meanwhile, the 16th Infantry, which was to make a
parallel advance on the left and move swiftly to Coutances, was unable to pass
through Marigny until late afternoon of 27 July. Against scattered opposition
and sporadic fire, the regiment advanced in a column of battalions immediately
south of the Coutances highway. Shortly before midnight the leading battalion
came abreast of CCB at a point directly south of Camprond.
Thus at midnight, 27 July, the 1st Division had
advanced on a front not quite three miles wide to a point about five miles west
of Marigny. Though no organized enemy
opposition was apparent, small enemy groups supported by an occasional tank or
antitank gun formed islands of resistance, floating and static, in the American
sea of advance, endangering both supply and evacuation. When twenty‑one
supply trucks loaded with rations, gasoline, ammunition, and military police
went forward from Marigny, a company of medium tanks accompanied them to give
protection. The column reached Camprond without incident, but, returning after
dark with two truckloads of prisoners, the column had to fight its way back to
Marigny. The attempt of a
reconnaissance platoon to cross the Lozon River three miles west of Marigny
stimulated a counterattack by about a hundred Germans supported by a medium
tank and an antitank gun. The platoon had to call for infantry and armor
reinforcements from the 9th and 1st Division before dispersing the enemy group.
The result of the main COBRA effort produced
disappointment. "Generally, we are not being able to push very fast,"
the VII Corps G‑3 admitted.
General Huebner had hoped to rip into the rear of the German defense
line. His troops were to have cut German telephone wires, disrupted
communications, and in general produced confusion and disorganization. But instead of raising havoc in a slashing
exploitation, the 1st Division had not yet secured Marigny and was only half
way to Coutances.
The reason for the disappointing advance by the
forces carrying the main COBRA effort was to be found in the German
dispositions. The LXXXIV Corps left
had made a withdrawal along the Cotentin west coast during the night of 26 July
with the intention of establishing a new main line of resistance. Yet on 27
July the contemplated positions of this line were becoming untenable even
before they were established because of the VII Corps threat developing west of
Marigny toward the German right (east) flank. When Hausser and Choltitz
suddenly became aware that American armored columns were moving through the
Marigny‑St. Gilles gap, they realized that they would have to move fast
to avoid encirclement from the east. There was no alternative to continuing the
withdrawal along the Cotentin west coast. To insure escape from encirclement,
they erected a northsouth defensive line facing eastward. Units manning the
line included elements of the depleted 17th
SS Panzer Grenadier Division, reluctantly withdrawing paratroopers, the 353d Division, and small elements of the
2d SS Panzer Division.
During the early afternoon of 27 July Choltitz
learned that American troops CCB of the 3d Armored Division, attached to the
1st Division‑seemed to have clear sailing toward Coutances. American
scouting parties on minor roads had made contact with artillery units of the 353d Division and the LXXXIV Corps, and German artillerymen
were fighting as infantry. Discovering also that American troops had reached
Guesnay, Choltitz ordered the engineer battalion of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division to "proceed immediately via
Montcuit and Cambernon to the railroad junction and seal off the front to the
east if you are not [now] engaged in battle.
Harassed continuously by fighterbombers, the
engineer battalion marched eight miles and took positions along the railroad
that night. Just to the north, the
battalion found a company of the 2d SS
Panzer Division defending Cambernon with ten Panther tanks. This north‑south
defensive line facing eastward, though far from strong, was efficacious in
slowing the 1st Division attack toward Coutances on 27 July. Farther south,
hastily organized positions between Carantilly and Quibou held up another
American armored column, this one driving toward Montpinchon.
Hausser, meanwhile, had requested permission to
withdraw the LXXXIV Corps to the
Geffosses‑St. Sauveur--Lendelin line. Soon afterward he wanted
authorization to withdraw even farther, to Coutances. In both cases, he planned
to make the withdrawal under the protection of the 2d SS Panzer Division, which was moving into the Cambernon
sector. However, all plans were held
in abeyance because Kluge, somewhat inexplicably to those in the Cotentin who
awaited his advice, was inspecting the Panzer
Group West front near Caen. Deciding they could wait no longer, Hausser and
Choltitz agreed to withdraw to Coutances and hold it as the anchor point of a
new line‑an arc through Cambernon, Sav'gny, and Cerisy‑la‑Salle.
Unfortunately for their plan, they were unaware that Panzer Lehr for all practical purposes no longer existed, and they
were counting on Panzer Lehr to hold
the Soulle River line at Pont‑Brocard.
When Kluge returned from the Caen sector late on the
afternoon of 27 July, he received a detailed report of a badly deteriorating
situation. The salient points were that the 353d
Division was presumed cut off and lost; the 352d Division on the west bank of the Vire was badly battered and
holding a shaky security line facing northwestward into a yawning gap; and
remnants of Panzer Lehr and the 275th Division, reinforced by what was
hoped was a tank battalion of the 2d SS
Panzer Division, were supposedly holding a line at Quibou and westward. The
Americans were running wild; details were not clear, but some troops were known
to have reached the village of Dangy, near the vicinity of the Panzer Lehr and the 275th Division command posts.
In this situation, Hausser recommended that Kluge
permit him to restore order by straightening the Seventh Army front. Hausser proposed to have the II Parachute Corps withdraw the 3d Parachute Division (east of the Vire)
“platoon by platoon" and have the LXXXIV
Corps pull back to the banks of the Soulle and Sienne Rivers. Actually, this maneuver relied on using the
nonexistent Panzer Lehr to hold a six‑mile
gap between Pont‑Brocard and the shaky 352d Division on the west bank of the Vire. Furthermore, it counted
on a tank battalion of the 2d SS Panzer
Division at Quibou that in reality had but fourteen tanks.
Still primarily concerned with the Caen sector held
by Panzer Group West, Kluge refused
to countenance the withdrawal by the II
Parachute Corps, which might expose the Panzer
Group West flank. He instead ordered the II Parachute Corps to defend in place in the St. Lo‑Caumont
sector while the LXXXIV Corps anchored
its forces on Coutances and executed a fighting withdrawal to the Soulles‑Sienne
river line. Meanwhile, he was assembling an experienced and somewhat rested
armored division in the Caumont area for action in the Cotentin. Aided by
whatever could be found of Panzer Lehr, the
275th Division, and the 2d SS Panzer Division, the experienced
armored division was to launch a counterattack to close the gap between the LXXXIV and II Parachute Corps of the Seventh
Army.
In addition to the 9th Panzer Division, which Kluge had requested on the previous day,
he asked OKW to send a total of four infantry divisions to Normandy from the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Armies. Still concerned with the Allied threat to invade
southern France, yet realizing that Kluge's situation was serious, Hitler
approved release of the 9th Panzer
Division for commitment in Normandy. On the following day, 28 July, he
authorized the movement to Normandy of three infantry divisions, the 84th, the 331st, and the 708th.
Meanwhile, in the Cotentin those LXXXIV Corps units still north of the
St. Lo‑Coutances highway infiltrated south through the VII Corps column
or moved around the western end of the American point during the night of 27
July. Covered by a reinforced regiment of the 2d SS Panzer Division ' which held a defensive arc from Cambernon
to Savigny, the units on the Cotentin west coast continued to move south on 28
July. The units were the depleted 243d
Division, the kampfgruppe of the 265th
Division, and elements of the 77th
Division and of the 5th Parachute
Division, all apparently under the operational control of the 91st Division. The 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division moved
in broad daylight, though harassed from the air, to Cerisy‑la‑Salle
in time to meet an American armored column there. At the same time the 6th Parachute Regiment, together with 2d SS Panzer Division tanks and the
engineer battalion of the 17th SS,
covered the rear of the withdrawal and protected Coutances from positions near
Ouville.
These moves reflected and contributed to the
changing situation. Already, on the evening of 27 July, General Bradley had
altered plans by assigning General Huebner's last two objectives‑Monthuchon
and the high ground north of Coutances‑to the VIII Corps. But since Huebner saw no certainty that the
VIII Corps could reach these objectives ahead of the 1st Division, he proceeded
on the tentative assumption that they might still be valid for him. Huebner
thus ordered a continuation of his attack on 28 July. CCB was to take
Cambernon, the 16th Infantry to capture Monthuchon, the 18th Infantry to remain
in the Marigny area, and the 26th Infantry to relieve CCB at
Cambernon. After relief, CCB would be free to drive to the high ground north of
Coutances if the VIII Corps was nowhere in evidence.
Developments on 28 July illustrated the discrepancy
between the results of COBRA as planned and as executed. North of the St. Lo‑Coutances
highway, CCB met little opposition on the move toward Cambernon. After knocking
out two Mark V Panther tanks with bazookas, reconnaissance troops took the
objective, securing it by noon. When Colonel Boudinot asked permission to continue
westward to Monthuchon, General Huebner approved after a check with General
Collins. (Map VI)
Almost immediately word came that VIII Corps had
already captured Monthuchon. Still anxious to take a part of his original objective,
Boudinot ordered his troops to bypass Monthuchon and take the high ground north
of Coutances. Huebner could not sanction a crossing of the north‑south
Periers‑Monthuchon‑Coutances highway because it had been reserved
for the VIII Corps, and he countermanded Boudinot's 'order. Although
reconnaissance elements were already infiltrating across the road and out
posting the high ground north of Coutances, the main body of CCB stopped in
time to prevent serious intermingling with the VIII Corps. Forced to halt, the tankers could see the
city of Coutances, less than two miles away.
Although Combat Command B had found little to
obstruct its advance, the 16th
Infantry, attacking westward toward Monthuchon in a zone south of the
St. Lo‑Coutances highway, advanced only slightly before reaching a well‑organized
defensive line. "Any contact with the enemy?" a division staff
officer asked on the telephone. "Three hundred and sixty degree
contact," came the somewhat exaggerated reply. The regiment made no further progress during the afternoon, even
though regimental attacks brought severe casualties and the loss of fifteen
tanks, seven of them mediums. Tactical aircraft, which might have helped, were
grounded because of cloudy weather.
Shortly before nightfall General Huebner told CCB to
go to the aid of the 16th Infantry. Turning to the southeast and attacking, the
combat command pinched the rear of the enemy position. Caught in a trap, the
German defense disintegrated. Before midnight CCB and the 16th Infantry made
contact.
Committed last, the 26th Infantry executed the 1st
Division's final COBRA action. Having passed through Marigny during the morning
of 28 July, it moved westward to take Cambernon. CCB's quick seizure of
Cambernon and the cancellation of Monthuchon and Coutances, as objectives for
the VII Corps prompted General Huebner to change the regimental mission to that
of sweeping the left flank of the division. Advancing through terrain infested
by stragglers and remnants of German units, the 26th Infantry executed what was
essentially a mop‑up operation. In the early evening the leading
battalion turned and faced south to exert pressure on the rear of German troops
trapped near the village of Savigny.
Like CCB's shift to the south, the 26th Infantry's
turn to the south was a consequence of the changing situation developing out Of
COBRA. According to the plan, the main battle was to have occurred in the
triangular region formed on the Cotentin west coast between Lessay and
Coutances by the highways from Lessay and Coutances to St. Lo. As the VIII
Corps exerted pressure south from the Lessay‑Periers road, the main
exploiting force of the VII Corps was to have raced to Coutances to cut off
German escape. "Did we lose the big fish in the trap?" a 1st Division
officer asked. "Yes, probably," came the reply. The division had lost two big fish: the
prestige of capturing Coutances and the opportunity of trapping large numbers
of Germans north of the St. Lo‑Coutances highway. In three days, the
division had taken only 565 prisoners.
The bulk of the Germans, by escaping the VII Corps main effort, had
slipped through the COBRA noose. As a result, the fighting shifted to the
region south of the Coutances‑St. Lo highway. The 1st Division had little
alternative but to face south and assume the role that the VIII Corps had
earlier played, the role of a pressure force.