H-AGOM-CNieilsen
Financing the AGOM
Initial Japanese landings in
Mindanao were for the purpose of obtaining advance bases for the Japanese drive
on Borneo. Although they also served to
hinder any reinforcements reaching the Philippines from the south.
The Sakaguchi and Miura Detachment
of about 5000 men landed at Davao on 20 December 1941 and by the middle of the
afternoon were in full control of the city.
An air raid by bombers from Australia two days later caused little
damage and did not delay the departure. of the Sakaguchi Detachment for Jola
Sulu Islands, which was occupied on 24 December. On 31 December the: Miura Detachment also took the town of Digos,
landing from the sea to circumvent USAFFE forces, which held the heights
surrounding Davao.
On 2 March the Japanese 32nd Naval
Base Force occupied Zamboanga City where they established a seaplane base.
Except for these and a few other minor incidents, the war in: Mindanao remained
relatively quiet. Repeated efforts by the Miura Detachment to extend its
control beyond Davao-and Digos were unsuccessful. Indeed, had it not been for their superiority in weapons,
particularly artillery and air support, they probably would not have been able
to maintain, even these footholds.
Eventually of course, the Japanese could be expected
to turn their attention subjugating the southern Philippines, but for the time
being they had their hands full on Luzon.
In the meantime, Gen William F. Sharp, in Mindanao, continued to
strengthen the island defenses and to train hastily Philippine regiments being
brought in from other islands. All
types of military supplies were in critically short supply, and as little help
could be expected from the outside, it was necessary to improvise as best as
was possible with what could be obtained locally. Ammunition stocks were so short that even with the arrival of a
million rounds of rifle ammunition on the submarine Sargo, its use was,
prohibited in firing practice. Most of the soldiers who were later to defend
Mindanao had not fired even a single practice round when they went into battle.
As for artillery, there were only eight outmoded 2.95 inch mountain guns; in
all Mindanao, and three of these, were lost at Davao.
Transportation and communications left much to be
desired. There were no railroads at all, and only two highways, portions of
which were still under construction and almost impassable in the rainy season.
Movements of supplies was primarily by small craft, along the coast or inland
by the rivers. Much of the interior was reachable only by narrow trails, and
some sections remain unexplored to this day.
Large areas of Mindanao were inhabited by Moslem Moros, long used to
plundering their more peaceful neighbors.
Never completely subdued, they had only been held in check under U.S.
Administration.
For defensive purposes Gen. Sharp
divided Mindanao into five sections each of which reported directly to his
headquarters at Del Monte, about ten miles inland from Macajalar Bay on the
Sayre Highway. Here too, were the Del; Monte airfields, with large American
ground crews but no aircraft. The
fields were used as a stopover and refueling point for occasional raids by
bombers from Australia. It was from these airfields that Gen MacArthur departed
for Australia on 17 March, and from which President Quezon. and his official
party would depart eight days later.
In the meantime the Japanese conquered Borneo and
Malaya - the British fortress of Singapore surrendering on 15 February. From these areas the Japanese were able to
withdraw battle-seasoned troops to complete their conquest of the Philippines.
The first contingent the Kawagachi Detachment
reached Luzon from Borneo on 1 April. Four days later the Kawamura Detachment
arrived from Malaya. These two
detachments, together with the Miura Detachment on Davao, were assigned to the
conquest of Mindanao. But the invasion
of Mindanao was postponed while the Kawaguchi force invaded Cebu, and the:
Kawamura form invaded Panay.
Late in April, three battalions of the Japanese 10th
Independent Garrison took over occupation duties in Cebu, Panay and Davao. Leaving the invasion forces of those areas
free to undertake the conquest, of Mindanao.
0n the morning of 29 April, 1942 the Kawaguchi
Detachment began landing at Cotabato and Parang. Against determined opposition
they began driving inland along highway No 1. Simultaneously Miura Detachment
began advancing along the same highway from Digos. On 3 May, elements of the two detachments met at the juncture
point of Sayre Highway with Highway No. 1. Gen Kawaguchi, with a force of 4,852
men, and with a little assistance, from the Miura Detachment, had gained
control of southern and western Mindanao.
On that day also, the Kawamura Detachment began landing in northern
Mindanao at-Cagayan and Togolan, barely ten miles from Gen. Forte’s
headquarters.
Considering their poor state of
training and equipment, with only five pieces of outmoded artillery the USAFFE
put up considerable resistance. But
with artillery, tanks and air support, the veteran Japanese forces were able to
overrun one defensive position, after another.
Even so, the outcome of the battle for Mindanao would be decided not
there, but on Corregidore.
On Corregidore the morning of 6 May,
Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright concluded that further resistance was hopeless and
decided to surrender. As he was also
-in. command of all USAFFE forces: in the Philippines, before surrendering he
relinquished command, by radio, to Gen. Sharp of all forces outside of Manila
Bay, and instructed Sharp to contact Gen. MacArthur in Australia for further
orders. However, the Japanese refused to accept Wainwright’s surrender unless
it included the entire Philippines. Having already ordered the destruction of
all arms on Corregidore, Wainwright had little choice but to submit to the
Japanese demands. He reassumed, command of the forces previously relinquished
to Gen. Sharp, and on the night of 7 May, over radio Manila, broadcast the
orders for all USAFFE forces in the Philippines to surrender.
This placed Gen, Sharp in a most difficult position.
He radioed the gist of the radio broadcast to MacArthur. The reply was
immediate. ORDERS EMANATING FROM GENERAL WAINWRIGHT HAVE NO VALIITY. IF POSSIBLE SEPARATE YOUR FORCE INTO SMALL
ELEMENTS AND INITIATE FUERRILLA OPERATIONS.
On 9 May an emissary from Wainwright informed Sharp that unless the
surrender orders were obeyed, the POW men on Corregidore would be
slaughtered. Because of this, but also
because he considered that further resistance on Mindanao would not effect the
course of the war, Sharp surrendered all forces under his command 10 May, 1942.
But issuing orders to surrender and
having them carried out were two different things. Communications had been
disrupted and radio codes destroyed.
Many units were ,out of touch except by runner. Other units bad been broken up and widely
scattered. There was much confusion and
little order. Thousands, refusing to
believe the orders, or simply ignoring them, took to the hills and
mountains. Criminal elements and renegade
Moros took advantage of the confusion to loot municipal treasuries and plunder
military stores murdering any who opposed them, including several American
officers and civil officials. The surrender was finally completed 27, May with
the capitulation of Gen Guy 0. Forte, commanding the Agusan sector. Those who surrendered received decent
treatment from the captors, the Japanese even passing out cigarettes. In fact they fared better than many who took
to the mountains. Reliable reports
claim that as many as five hundred un-surrendered soldiers were murdered by the
Moros in order to obtain what weapons they had or what few pesos they
possessed.
Betrayed by the army to whom they
had looked for protections stunned and bewildered people were left to the mercy
of the Japanese conquerors. In the beginning the civilians too, were decently
treated. Japanese troops garrisoned
only the larger cities, with small, patrols to smaller towns. Civilians and government officials who had
evacuated to rural areas were urged to return with promises of good treatment.
Few did so. Most adopted a "wait-and-see" position, preferring to
remain as far away from the Japanese as possible.
It was well they did so. During,
June the situation radically, altered.
The elite invasion forces were withdrawn from further duty in the
southwest Pacific, to be replaced by second rate garrison troops. Treatment of civilians became harsh and
arrogant. Stores were commandeered,
possessions looted, women raped.
Beatings and, executions became almost, commonplace inflicted for the
slightest provocation. Patrols were
sent out to apprehend un-surrendered American soldiers and civilians, and it
was announced that any who failed to turn then selves in by 30 June would be
subject to the death penalty. Civilians
suspected of giving aid to un-surrendered soldiers were beaten and tortured.
In the prison camps also, those who
surrendered were learning the cruelty of the conqueror. There were many
escapes, despite a cruel death to any recaptured, and indiscriminate executions
of prisoners in retaliation for those who succeeded. Gen. Guy 0. Forte was
executed on 11 November, on the. Charge he had failed to surrender all his
military stores, but actually because he refused to help the Japanese in inducing
the Moros to surrender their arms.
It was this brutality of the Japanese occupation
forces that stimulated the rise of guerrilla bands and ensured their support
from the people. Throughout all Mindanao un-surrendered soldiers were organized
into guerrilla bands to get back at a hated enemy. Small at first, their numbers increased through the addition of
volunteers and released or escaped prisoners.
But there was little cooperation among them. Many were antagonistic, jealously defining their own small areas,
or seeking to expand them at the expense of others. Not all were well b___ some hardly better than b__. Still, to the civilians even they were
preferable to the Japanese.
At
every opportunity Japanese patrols and forage parties were ambushed , if for no
other reason than __at arms captured in
such ___ served to strengthen the guerrilla groups. By August, the Japanese
seldom left their garrisons and then only in large heavily armed patrols, or in
armored cars along the main highways.
The guerrillas grew, in numbers and launched attacks
against
the smaller and more isolated garrisons.
Such attacks often lasted for days, ending only when Japanese
reinforcements arrived, or when the guerrilla ammunition was exhausted.
Among those who had refused to
surrender was Capt. Luis P. Morgan and his 8th Lanao Company (Philippine
Constabulary) which were located in the area of Kolumbugan. Morgan was a born leader and attracted to
him many un-surrendered soldiers and small guerrilla bands. As his force increased, so did his
administrative problems. Realizing he
did not have the ability to handle this alone, and hearing that an
un-surrendered American officer, Lt. Col. Wendell W. Fertig, was in the
vicinity, Morgan contacted him suggesting, Fertig take command of his forces.
Col. Fertig, a mining engineer and
Reserve officer, had served on both Bataan and Corregidore. Ordered to Australia, he was among those who
left Corregidore .29 April on two PBY flying boats. Stranded in Mindanao when one of the aircraft punctured a pontoon
on lake Lanao, Fertig served as a demolitions officer for Gen. Sharp. When Sharp surrendered, Fertig with two
companions attempted to join Gen. Fort who, rumor had it was still fighting. Before he could, do so, Fort had surrendered.
Since then Fertig had bided his time, waiting for just such an opportunity as
now presented itself
Morgan, of course, intended to use
Fertig as a figurehead shuffling papers at some desk, while he would remain in
actual command. Fertig was well aware of. this, but had ideas of his own. With
Morgan's unit as a beginning, he envisioned nothing less than the unification
of all guerrilla groups, under a single command -- his.
At a-meeting with Morgan and his officers on 18
September, Fertig agreed to take command with the assumed rank of Brigadier
General. As there were already several
guerrilla leaders calling themselves "General" it was decided also to
spread the rumor that Fertig had arrived by submarine from Australia, to
command the guerrilla forces. Morgan was to be Chief of Staff, with the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel.
ordered
the collection of all privately owned firearms which were still stored in
municipal buildings, and that Japanese forces, were small and scattered. Fertig immediately sent Morgan with a large
force to seize the arms. Within a week
all of Misamis Occidental and northern Zamboanga under Fertig's control, with
the American and Philippine flags flying side by side from government buildings.
The Japanese troops had been sent to join their ancestors.
In early October Fertig established
his Headquarters in the Municipality of Misamis, from which he issued a
Proclamation (backdated to 18 September) reestablishing the Commonwealth
Government in areas under guerrilla control, signed. W. W. Fertig, Brigadier
General, USA Commanding.
He officially designated his
organization as the United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), Mindanao
and Sulu Command.
Well aware that the support of the
civilian population was essential for success, Fertig's first acts were to
restore civil government, appointing "Military Governors" for Lanao,
Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga. All loyal officials were urged to remain in
office, those suspected of having collaborated with the Japanese were
replaced. All laws and regulations of
the Commonwealth Government were to remain in effect except those which
conflicted with military authority. To insure a minimum of friction in this
respect, Fertig appointed highly respected civilians as Civil Affairs Officers
to handle liaison between the military (guerrilla) force and the civil
government.
Just as things were getting,
organized a motor launch bringing Japanese reinforcements attempted to dock at
Misamis. It was beaten off with over forty Japanese killed. This incident certainly helped to enhance
the prestige of the new command.
Word was sent into the hills and
mountains for all un-surrendered soldiers, particularly Americans, to report
for duty. Over a hundred Americans
reported, 90% of them of enlisted men. They were put to whatever duty they
seemed to be suited for and eventually most of the enlisted
Men
were given Commissions as guerrilla officers.
Morgan with headquarters Expeditionary
Forces was sent on a mission that reached into out skirts of Japanese occupied
Zamboanga City where they destroyed the hydroelectric plant. En-route he
contacted other guerrilla groups which joined the USFIP. After he returned he undertook a similar
mission in the opposite direction, which took him as far as Leyte.
Liaison officers were sent to
contact guerrilla units on other islands stressing the need for cooperation to
combat a common foe.
Slowly the organization was expanded
and consolidated. But it would be over a year-and formal. recognition by
MacArthur before the “hold-out" in Mindanao came under Fertig's command,
and civil government could established in the other provinces. During that time
Fertig would put down five mutinies, one of them led by Morgan. That he was able to do so without bloodshed
is a tribute to his tact and ability.
Even more remarkable was that he not only put a stop to Moro
depredations, but obtained their support in fighting the Japanese. Considering
that the Moros were far better armed than own forces, it was a remarkable
accomplishment. His command included not only Mindanao and Sulu but Negros
Oriental and a part of British North Borneo.
His influence although not always for the ___ would be felt in Leyte,
Borneo and Cebu. His Intelligence network would extend from Borneo; to ___ and
among his trusted agents were Catholic Priests and the Japanese puppet
government:
One
of the major problems confronting Fertig was a matter of finance. In the
beginning, such was met with voluntary contributions and by signing vouchers
which were readily accepted for food and other supplies. The old Spanish Custom of requiring every
able bodied male civilian contribute so many days service each month was
revived. C___ officials voluntarily served at h___ and the military force
receoved only token pay to provide for necessities. A Women's Auxiliary manufactured soap wool and made even this
could not finance both the military force and the civil government. The dilemma
was I solved by printing currency.
Let us, for a moment, go back to the
outbreak of the war. The enormously increased military expenditures created a
shortage of currency. With the Japanese
occupation of Manila all currency supplies for the southern Philippines were cut
off. Commonwealth President Manuel L
Quezon authorized the creation of several currency boards to print currency to
meet the emergency, best even these were insufficient. Many Provinces in
Mindanao were: authorized to print currency only, if necessary, to an amount up
to two thirds of their unencumbered bank deposits. Among those which did so was Misamis Occidental. The Currency Committee was composed of F. D.
Pacan, Provincial Treasurer,, as Chairman, with Ireneo Barbasa, Provincial
Auditor, and Ramon 0. Nolasea, Provincial Fiscal, as Members. They issued only
two denominations; fifty centavos and one peso, both printed an white paper.
Although they were authorized to print over a million pesos, only 74,999 pesos
were printed when the paper supply was exhausted and printing operations
ceased. (See the October 1974 issue of B.N.R-)
The Committee therefore still
retained the authority to print the un-issued balance. This was brought to
Fertig’s attention as a solution to the financial problem.
It took time to contact the
Committee members, some of; whom were in Japanese occupied cities, and to
arrange for their "escape" to the free areas. It took time also to procure stocks of paper
and ink. Finally, in December, 1942, the Committee resumed printing of
currency. As fractional change was a dire necessity, notes of 10, 20 and 50
centavos were printed. The one-peso
denomination was omitted to conserve paper, and notes of two pesos and
five-pesos were printed instead. Brown wrapping paper was used, as it was all
that was available. By the middle of January, 1943 the authorized amount had
been printed and the Currency Committee was dissolved.
The serial numbers printed, and
quantities issued are as follows:
|
10c
0001-100,000 |
(99,983
issued) |
|
20c
0001-100,000 |
(99,985
issued) |
|
50c
30,001-260,000 |
(227,000
issued) |
|
2.00
0001-100,000 |
(100,00(
issued) |
|
5.00
0001-120,000 |
(116,492
issued) |
A total of 925,955.70 pesos were;
issued. The discrepancy between the number of notes printed and: issued is due
to; (a) a Japanese bombing attack an the capitol buildings in Oroqueita on 26
December which destroyed 3,000 fifty centavo notes and 3,500 five peso notes,
and (b) misprinted notes which were destroyed.
The numbering of the fifty centavo notes commenced where those of, the
pre-surrender emergency printing had ended.
PART 2
In a nipa hut, some distance from
the barrio of Bonifacio near the foot of Panguil Bay, the Radio Section of the
Mindanao-Sulu Command, USFIP, was attempting to build a long range radio
transmitter. Their instruction manual was an old I.C.S. correspondence course;
their equipment was what ever they could find, and makeshift substitutes for
whatever they couldn't. By trial and
error the work proceeded. The result was an unbelievable maze of wires and
parts that filled the hut and covered the walls.
In December, 1942, the contraption
began to hum and show signs of life.
That it actually worked was proven when contact was made with a small
ham set operated in Negros by Roy Bell.
Thus encouraged, they kept sending ever the 36 meter band. I CALLING CQ. CALLING CQ, WE HAVE URGENT
INFORMATION FOR MIIITARY AUTHORITIES! IN AUSTRAIJA, followed by a short message
in code, based on an old military cipher. The days crept slowly by, becoming
weeks. And still no answer.
The message was being received. In fact it’s screeching and wailing was a
major headache to the operators who manned radio station KFS in San
Francisco. But they were trying hard to
ignore it. Intelligence had quickly
decoded the message, but as the cipher was one discontinued after the fall of
corregidore it was considered a Japanese trick, an attempt to jam their
reception. Answering would inform the Japanese
that their efforts were successful. Christmas passed and the New Year began,
finally information from other intelligence sources indicated the messages
might be authentic. KFS was instructed
to reply. Thus: contact was finally
established, and a new code set up. The information was duly passed on to
intelligence, and Fertig-was instructed to stand by.
Meanwhile over in Panay, Col.
Peralto had already established radio contact with MacArthur in -Australia on
January 16, 1943, a message from MacArthur designated Peralta as MILITARY GUERRILA
CHIEFTAN OPERERATING IN TEMPORARILY CONQUERED LAND. The jubilant Peralta lost
no time in spreading this good news through the Visayas. In Negros Roy Bell
picked it up :and in turn passed it on to Mindanao.
Fertig was furious. Previously Peralto had agreed to
place his IV Philippine-Corps under the command of "General Fertig."
But communication by courier were slow and hazardous. No acknowledgement from
Fertig had been received by Peralto when he established radio contact, and if
it arrived later it was conveniently forgotten. The first to establish. Radio contact, Peralta had no intention
of sharing the rewards.
Fertig’s impatience and frustration continued to
grow as he sweat out the days with no further word from KPS. His-own position
was none too secure. Many rival
organizations on Mindanao continued to remain aloof. Worse still, some-were
openly antagonistic. Official
recognition by MacArthur would enable Fertig to bring these organizations under
his control.
As January came to an end, Fertig could stand the
frustration no more. In a message
addressed to the War Department, Fertig radioed KFS. . . AS SENIOR AMERICAN
OFFICER IN THE PHILIPINE ISLANDS I HAVE ASSUMED COMMAND OF -MINDANAO AND
VISAYAS WITH RANK OF BRIGADIER GENERAL -- AS LEADER OF THE GUERRILLA FORCES WE
HAVE REACTIVATED THE USFIPI AND ESTABLISHED CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE HANDS OF
DULY ELECTED COMMON-WEALTH OFFICIALS. And that, thought Fertig, should take
care of Peralta.
Unknown to Fertig, MacArthur had already been
accurately informed about the Mindanao-Sulu Command. Charles A. Smith had made
it to Australia.
Smith a mining engineer from Masbate Consolidated
had served, as a demolitions officer for Gen. Sharp along with Fertig. He too
had taken to the mountains rather than surrender, and in July had joined
Fertig. But he had gotten it; into his head that he could sail small boat to
Australia, and Fertig couldn't talk him out of it. Smith, with a few companions, had started out in early December
and reached Australia New Years Eve. The
party was promptly flown to MacArthur's headquarters, where :they were
interrogated on all aspects of the Philippines. It was while their reports were
being carefully studied that the War Department forwarded on Fertig's message.
Fertig would-have been better off if the message had
never been sent. The brass in Australia
didn't take kindly to his promoting himself to General rank. There was also this, matter of the Visayan
Islands, which Peralta had already reported were organized into the IV Philippine
Corps under his command. The situation
obviously: called for immediate action before things got entirely out of hand.
The best course of action would be to send an
observer to Mindanao, who could evaluate the situation and report directly to
MacArthur. The Navy had previously
agreed to the use of their submarines for such purposes, and a
"Penetration, Party" from the Intelligence Bureau had already been
sent to Negro. Another submarine was
now available and a similar party could be sent to Mindanao, along with a few
tons of supplies and propaganda materials.
But
it would take time for such a party to reach there, and the urgency of the
situation called for immediate action. Peralta was ordered- to dissolve his IV
Philippine Corps, and his command was restricted to the fifth Military District
(Panay). Fertig was radioed. COMMAND
AREAS WILL. BE PROGRESSIVELY ESTABLISHED ON EXISTING MILITARY DISTRICTS.
COMMANDERS OF DISTRICTS WILL OPERATE UNDER CONTROL OF THIS HEADQUARTERS, AND
ASSIGNMENT WILL BE SUBJECT, TO REVIEW ON BASIS OF PERFORMANCE. LT. COL. FERTIG
(CF) INF. IS DESIGNATED COMMANDER 10TH MILITARY DISTRICT (MINDANAO)
. . . NO OFFICER OF RANK OF GENERAL WILL -BE DESIGNATED AT PRESENT. MACARTHUR
Fertig had hoped his message would
result in action, which it did, but hardly in the manner he anticipated.
MacArthur's orders left him stunned. In
vain Fertig protested that his assumed rank, was essential, that Oriental
Negros had voluntarily joined his organization. His protests were ignored. The
Sulu Islands did remain under his command as they were part of the 10th
Military District.
On February 6th, 1943, Fertig,
issued General Order No. 16, re-designating his command as the 10th Military
District, USFIIP, to- take effect as of March 1st. In a subsequent
order he continued in force all Orders, Directives and Proclamations previously
issued in: his name as Commanding General of the Mindanao-Sulu Command. But even though he reverted to his
pre-surrender rank of Lieutenant Colonel, he would always be "the
General" to the people of Mindanao.
In Australia, plans to send supplies
and observers to Mindanao went forward swiftly. On February 17th the submarine USS Tambor unobtrusively
departed. Aboard were two officers from
MacArthur's Intelligence Bureau. Charles A- Smith, in the uniform of an Army Captain was returning
as supply officer to the very place he had risked his life to leave. As MacArthur's "observer" was Lt.
Comdr. Charles “Chick” Parsons, USNFL.
Chick" Parsons was a prominent Manila businessman with varied
interests had made him well acquainted with the Philippines. At the outbreak of the war he was the head
of Luzon Stevedoring and had temporarily acted Panamanian Consul. A Reserve Officer, he had been called to
active duty and assigned to Naval intelligence. When the Navy evacuated Manila, the Reserve personnel were left
behind. “Chick" simply returned
home, took off his uniform, hoisted the Panamanian flag over his residence and
proclaimed himself the Consul of a neutral nation. When the Japanese arrived he spoke only Spanish announced the
Consulate closed due to the war, and demanded repatriation to Panama. The foreign community was so appalled at the
atrocious conduct of the Japanese troops that not even the German or Italian
embassy betrayed him. Parsons and his
family were among those repatriated in mid 1942 on the Swedish liner Gripsholm.
On reaching Washington he reported to the Navy for duty. His first hand reports of Japanese
activities in the Philippines were of great value to Naval intelligence and the
Department of State. At MacArthur’s
request he was flown to Australia where he was assigned to the Philippine
Regional Section, (PRS) of MacArthur's Allied: Intelligence Bureau (AIB). He
too was now returning to the Philippines.
Fertig duly informed of the time and rendezvous area
where four tons of supplies would be delivered by submarine. To anyone as
desperately short of everything four tons seems a lot. He was therefore present
when the USS Tamor arrived at Pagadian
Bay on March 5th. There were radio transmitters carbines, ammunition and
medicines. There were 29 matches and
small packages of cigarettes on which were printed "I Shall Return.
MacArthur”. There were even recent
magazines and 10,000 dollars U.S. and 100,000 pesos in Philippine currency.
But the four tons sounded like a lot, as supplies
were brought ashore he realized how little it really was. Distributed, it would; amount to a few
carbines per regiment, a handful of cartridges per man. The currency would be: only half as much
when he learned he was to send half of it to Peralta. Still, to men so short of ammunition, that empty brass cartridge
shells were re-loaded with homemade powder and a sharpened piece of brass
curtain rod for a bullet, even a handful of new cartridges would be a
prize. The radios would enable quick
communications with units which now required days and weeks by courier. The important point was not the amount, but
that it was here, proof that they were not forgotten, that aid was on the way.
He
had not been informed that Smith and Parsons were coming, so Fertig was both
pleased and surprised to greet his friends. That is, until they bluntly told
him they were sent to investigate both his: organization and his ability to
continue as commander. He had barely recovered from that low blow, when they
delivered a few more. MacArthur wasn't
interested in how many Japs they killed he wanted only one thing --
intelligence information. The radios
were to set' up a coast watcher network, the carbines and ammo were for the
networks protection. The guerrillas were to lie low, avoid contact with the
enemy, devote their efforts to gathering information. They would be amply supplied with arms when MacArthur returned
and could kill Japs then.
Fertig
could hardly believe his ears. Did they
really think in Australia that the civilians would continue to support the
guerrillas if they, in turn, did nothing to protect the civilians? Did they believe that guerrillas whose
families had been tortured raped and murdered, would be content to sit idly on
a mountain top scanning the seas for a passing ship?
Both
Charlie and "Chick" I agreed with Fertig. But as they pointed out, it was not what they: thought, or Fertig
thought, it was what the brass in Australia thought. Particularly Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, who was head of
PRS. Willoughby didn't think that. any
gang of bare foot guerrillas were going
to succeed where a regular army had failed.
(Willoughby-would become renowned as having the best
hind sight of anyone in the Pacific).
To
protect those radios, Fertig pointed out, was going to take more than a few
carbines. The Japs had vectoring equipment which would detect their location,
and they would attempt to silence them. He would need automatic weapons,
machine guns and mortars. Of course,
they agreed, but if he got them he must not use them in an offensive
manner. Certainly not, Fertig assured
them, farthest thing from his mind.
The
arrival of the Submarine and news of "the aid" spread like
wildfire. The cigarettes and matchbooks
were widely distributed and even when empty, continued to pass from hand to
hand. The magazines gradually fell
apart, but got an even wide circulation as individual pages were passed on.
They were the proof of the aid, proof they had not been forgotten.
Rival
guerrilla groups which had remained aloof now willingly joined with
Fertig. Datu Busran Kalaw, General of
the Maranao Moro battalions accepted a rank of Major in the USFIP, as did
General Salipada Pendatun of the Cotabato Moro’s
Pendatun's
force was as large as Fertig's and far better armed. Immediately after the surrender the Moros had looted the USAFFE
depots, as well as taking arms from, deserting and fleeing soldiers. They held
the interior of Cotabato and the southern part of Bukidnon. Pendatun had earlier agreed to cooperate
with Fertig, but when Fertig misconstrued this as submission, relations had
become considerably strained. Fertig
resented Pendatun's using the rank of general, but Pendatun was more entitled
to the rank than was Fertig. Pendatun
had not assumed the rank as had Fertig. He had been elected to generalship by
his officers, some of whom were Americans.
In April, Quezon created a second
Mindanao Emergency Currency Board, which under Maj. Sam Wilson was soon turning
out currency in the barrio of Matugas, near Jiminez. This was the same Sam Wilson, who as a Naval lieutenant had
supervised the printing of currency by the first Mindanao Emergency Currency
Board, prior to the surrender.
Two more small shipments of supplies
arrived by submarine, this time the USS Trout at Basilan on May 26th, and at
Pagadian Bay an June 12th. The Trout
was scheduled to arrive again on July 9th, with more supplies, and also to
evacuate Smith and Parsons to personally report to MacArthur.
Eleven months had passed since
Fertig had first assumed command, and all this time the Japanese had, strangely
left them comparatively unmolested But the Japanese had not been idle quietly
by reducing a garrison here eliminating another there, they had successfully
built up and trained a large force in anti-guerrilla operations.
On the morning of June 26th the Japanese struck
swiftly and with a large force. A
cruiser and two destroyers shelled the shore while Japanese troops landed from
transports Japanese aircraft strafed the beaches, villages and towns. Landings were made at: several points along
the northern coast as as well as in southern Zamboanga, Caught by surprise, with
shells crashing around them, the guerrilla soldiers manning the beach defenses
simply fled. All of Fertig's carefully laid plans an hopes came crashing down
around his ears.
Sam Wilson hastily burned thousands of pesos in
partially printed money, buried the plates, and hid presses in the jungle to
prevent their capture. The Japanese moved rapidly inland, with almost no
opposition. Smith and Parsons narrowly escaped the Japanese. They struggled
over the mountains to the submarine rendezvous. Pagadian Bay was in Japanese hands, they met the submarine in the
launch General Fertig, at a new point, far offshore. But on its return with the
supplies, the launch was lost to the Japanese.
Miraculously, the civil government escaped capture,
as did nearly all of the guerrillas. Slowly, in small groups guerrillas began
to fight back. The groups became larger
and better organized. Day by day the resistance to the invader increased and
the Japanese began to withdraw into the coastal towns. Less than a month after complete
disaster,
the guerrillas once again became an organization, leaner an tougher than
before.
With the coastal towns in Japanese
hands Fertig, in August temporarily set up his headquarters; at Liangan, Lanao,
where after considerable difficulty, printing currency by Sam Wilson was resumed. In November, the headquarters was moved to
Esperanza in Agusan.
On the night of November 15, 1943,
the USS Narwhal, a large cargo submarine, tied up at the dock in Nasipit on the
shore of Butuan Bay, while the band of the 110th Division USFIP blared forth
with the Stars and Stripes Forever.
“Chick” Parsons had return to personally deliver 92 tons of supplies.
There were not just carbines, but,
submachine guns, 50 calibre machine guns, bazookas, rocket launchers and 20 mm
cannon, although somehow ammunition for the cannon had been overlooked. “Chick" assured Fertig the Narwhal
would return again in three weeks with more supplies including the 20 mm
ammo. There were jungle boots and khaki
uniforms radio, tools and spare parts.
There were propaganda supplies, book
matches, cigarettes, chocolate bars, magazines and MacArthur's: newspaper “Free
Philippines”. And although there was no postal service on Mindanao there were
even guerrilla postage stamps inscriber "Free Philippines." Affixed carrier mail and cancelled .with
proud slogans, they would be a morale buster to all those who saw them.
There were thousands of pesos in genuine Philippine
currency, a million pesos in counterfeit Japanese occupation notes. There was
paper and printing supplies and engraved metal plates from which to reprint
guerrilla currency. There were even letters from home.
It was an historic occasion, a U.S. Naval vessel
docked a thousand miles behind Japanese lines. Not, one to let such an
opportunity to slip by, Fertig had even arranged for Col Kangleon of Leyte, and
Maj. Ingeniero of Bohol to be present and that, thought Fertig would eliminate
Peralta's influence in those islands.
In
five hours the cargo had been. completely unloaded. When, just after midnight,
the sub departed, it took with it 32 American evacuees, including 8 women, 2
children, and 1 baby.
As
scheduled, the Narwhal returned on December 2nd, with 90 more tons of supplies.
This time it brought back Charles Smith, now a Lieutenant Colonel, who would go
on to Samar as an Allied Intelligence agent and eventually, restore
communications with the numerous Luzon guerrilla units.
In
late December the Japanese again re-invaded Mindanao in force. No longer did the guerrillas. simply
run. This time they fought with
determination. They could not prevent
the Japanese penetration, but they made it costly. It was a, conflict that
continued almost unabated for over a year and a half more. Anticipating that
the Americans would eventually land, in Mindanao, the Japanese continued to
pour in reinforcements. Fertig's
guerrillas were confronted with a force five times as large as the Japanese had
needed to capture the island originally.
On
October 20, 1944, American Liberation forces landed in Leyte. But it was March, 1945, before any American
forces landed in Mindanao. In the
meantime, it was the guerrillas who fought the Japanese. When the first American forces did arrive in
Mindanao, they landed from transport planes at the guerrilla held airfield in
Dipolog Zamboanga. The next day a landing was effected unopposed at Zamboanga
City. By the first of April the
Zamboanga peninsula had been secured and the guerrillas were left to mop
up. On April 17, American forces landed
at Parang (Cotabato) and Malabang (Lanao), the identical points the Japanese!
had landed on April 29, three years before.
But thanks to the guerrillas, the Americans landed unopposed. By June 30th, the U.S. Army considered that
organized, resistance in Mindanao had ceased.
But for the guerrillas in Mindanao, the fighting would continue until
the end of the war. That such fighting
was hardly desultory can be gleaned that over 23,500 Japanese surrendered in
Mindanao after hostilities ceased on August, 15, 1945.
If
any reader is interested in delving further into the Mindanao guerrilla
movement, may I recommend you check your local library for two very good books
on. the subject: Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao
by Father Edward Haggerty (Longmans, Green &Co., New York, 1946),
and They Fought: Alone by John Keats (.J. B. Lippincott, 1963). The latter is
also available in paperback, by Pocket books, Inc. No.-75058.
Part 3
In October 1942 the headquarters of
the Mindanao-Sulu Command, USPIP, was established in the municipality of
Misamis, province of Misamis .Occidental.
Shortly after this, Wendell W. Fertig, Brigadier; General USA,
Commanding, issued a Proclamation reestablishing the Commonwealth government in
those areas, under guerrilla control. At that time this consisted only of
Misamis Occidental and the, northern part of Zamboanga.
Beset by enormous difficulties,
Fertig's command was gradually extended to cover all of Mindanao. Among the ma)or problems confronting Fertig
was the matter of currency and finance.
Prior to the-occupation of Manila by
Japanese forces, the Commonwealth government, and its Treasury, had been
evacuated to Corregidore. Realizing
that it would be almost impossible to send currency supplies from Corregidore
to the southern Philippines, President Queizon had created several Currency
Boards which he authorized to print and issue emergency currency. Two such
boards were created in Negros, one in Panay, two in Cebu and one in
Mindanao. Even this had not provided
sufficient currency, so Quezon also authorized the Provincial Treasurers to
print emergency currency, if necessary. In Mindanao alone, four Provinces had
done so.
Thus
there was in circulation in Mindanao a wide variety of emergency currencies
which even
been
regared with a certain amount of distrust, and often accepted with reluctance.
Such notes tended to circulate as less than face, either by being discounted.
Or by an increase in price of commodities when they were presented in payment.
To further complicate matters, the circulation and use of the emergency currencies
had been, strictly prohibited by Japanese military authorities, who were,
introducing their own military notes.
To shore up the depreciating value
of the emergency notes Fertig issued a-Proclamation dated 16 November 1942,
ordering that
(1) No person shall discriminate
between the emergency notes and the old Philippine currency nor increase the
prices of foods stuffs or any article sold to the public if the money paid
therefore is in the form of emergency notes.
(2) No person shall engage in, the purchase
and sale of emergency notes at a depreciated value through payment there fore
with old Philippine currency.
(3) Any person violating the
provisions of this Proclamation shall be punished as the Military Authorities
may direct.
This proclamation was followed on 25 November by a
circular which stipulated the punishment to be meted out: 1st
offense: 1 to- 10 days detention
2nd
offense: 11 to 20 days detemtion
3rd
offense: 21 to 30- days detention
For any offense committed :subsequent to the third offense
detention for the duration of the emergency. Fertig ordered that both the
proclamation and circular be given wide publicity and conspicuously posted in
public places.
Even so, the pre-surrender “emergency” notes never
achieved the same prestige as regular Philippine currency. They were accepted
primarily, because “real" currency had almost disappeared from
circulation.
In January Fertig established radio contact with
MacArthur's headquarters in Australia. As
a result his guerrilla I organization was officially reorganized and designated
the 10 Tenth Military District. Fertig
was named Commanding Officer with his pre-surrender rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
Having
achieved official recognition, Fertig radioed MacArthur his future plans which
were: (a) issuance of a, proclamation canceling the authority given by
President, Quezon to Provincial: governments to print currency, (b) to
reconstitute the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board with new members, (c) to use
previous authority granted the original board by Quezon to print currency, and
(d) to use the currency thus printed to finance the civil government and the
military forces of the Tenth Military District. (Fertig even sent along a
requisition for printing supplies he would need.)
These
"future plans" created quite a stir at MacArthurs headquarters, and
resulted in a barrage of messages to Fertig. Apparently they were not nearly so
well informed about Philippine matters as Fertig had been led to believe. In a
carefully worded reply, Fertig patiently explained:
"Central control of financial situation here
requires use of one central board, namely Mindanao Emergency Board, continue to
exercise power as originally granted to issue emergency notes civil, and military
requirements for, entire Tenth Military District. Appointment new personnel to
the board as necessary as, personnel former board namely Guingona, Laya, and
Alagaban are now in control of enemy. New personnel recommended are government
officials chosen for proximity this headquarters and for their splendid
cooperation with military organization. Request approval appointment new
members Mindanao Emergency Currency Board as recommended
and authority to issue such currency as may be
required for civil and military Purposes under supervision and control this
headquarters."
That
cleared things up a bit it also solved a problem MacArthur's staff had been
wrestling with -- whether MacArthur should grant Fertig permission to print
“military script” as had been previously granted to Col. Peralta in Panay. Fertig's plan eliminated any such
necessity. Of course it dumped the
currency problem in the lap of President Quezon, but that was fine with
MacArthur, just so long as it wasn't his own lap.
Accordingly
Fertig's recommendations were radioed to President Quezon in Washington,
without comment, leaving the decision entirely up to him. Quezon never hesitated. -Back came a prompt
reply, which MacArthur duly passed on to Fertig:
"I
appoint Judge Florentinol Saguin, Provincial, Treasurer Filomeno Pacana and
Provincial Auditor Isidoro Barbasa as new Currency Board and they are hereby
given the same authority granted to previous; board not repeat not only for
military requirements but limited amount for relief of the civilian
population."
(For
the record, I must here point out that Auditor Barbasa's first name is
"Ireneno” not “Isidoro" -as given in the message. The mistake was Fertig's, as he gave the
name, wrong when he submitted them originally.
Understandable perhaps as Barbasa rarely used his first name.)
In
Mindanao, preparations for printing currency had already gotten well
underway. Sam Wilson, now a guerrilla
Major, was once again in charge of printing operations. As fractional notes were badly needed, it
was planned to issued currency in denominations of 10, 20 and 50 centavos,
along with denominations of 1, 2. 5, 10 and 20 pesos. Wooden "cuts" had been made for the 2 peso note (face
only) and for both sides of the 5, 10 and 20
Peso
notes along with commonwealth "seals" and facsimile signatures of the
members of the Currency Board. All
other printing would be from metal type. Stocks of brown wrapping paper had
been acquired, which was all that was available.
As soon as printing got underway ,
Fertig issued proclamation back dated to 1 April announcing Quezon’s
appointment of a new Mindanao Emergency Board with authority granted the
currency board with authority to print circulating notes in such quantity as
necessary, which were to be accepted at par with regular Philippine currency .
Also, that the authority granted the Provincial governments to print currency
___oked for all provinces in the tenth Military District
Fertig did not have authority to
inhibit the printing of currency __ the
different provincial governmentes , which had been granted by Quezon. But ___
was taking no chances that some rival guerrilla group to copy his own example,
___ currency in one of the ___ as he had previously ___ Misamis Occidental. No
___ Quezon would have ___ this authority himself ____ portion of Fertigs plans ___ sent to him, but for some
reason MacArthur had avoided that little matter.
Printing operations began 5 ___ 1943, at Matugas, a
small ____ of the municipality of ___ Misamis Occidental ___. The actual printing ___ under contract by
____ Z. Bararro, who was ____ stipulated amount for ____ thousand notes
printed. ___, the printing operation as well as the checking, and numbering,
counting and packaging was done under the supervision of Representaives
appointed by the members of the Currency Board. (The __ members were far too __
with other matters to be ___do this in person.) When ___ and packaged, the money was turned over to
Provincial Treasure Filomeno D. Pacana who in turn
distributed them to governmental agencies and guerrilla finance officers as
needed. Prior to distribution, however, the-large peso denominations were
countersigned by hand, on the reverse, by individuals specifically authorized
by the Currency Board to do so.
On 26 June 1943, the Japanese invaded Misamis
Occidental. They caught the guerrillas by surprise and rapidly moved inland.
At Matugas the press personnel were awakened early
that morning by the roar of Japanese planes and the sound of gunfire. Not long afterwards people fleeing from the
Japanese reported that Misamis, Clarin, Tudela and Oroquieta were already in
Japanese hands. Sam Wilson arrived and
directed preparations to evacuate. Thousands of pesos in printed but undelivered
currency were hurriedly burned. The presses
were hastily dismantled and along with remaining stocks of paper and ink were
sent to the hills to be hidden. Printing plates and type too heavy to be
carried with them were buried, and personnel dispersed to the hills. When the
Japanese arrived there was no remaining trace of the "mint".
In Oroquieta that morning, Provincial Treasurer
Pacana was alerted very early to the danger.
Hurrying to the government building housing, the Treasury he alerted the
soldiers assigned to guard duty there. With their help the currency on hand,
amounting to 702,619.30 pesos was packed into four sacks. They evacuated the
town just ahead of the advancing Japanese. For the next eleven months Pacana
would carry out his duties as Provincial Treasurer in remote areas, prudently
moving the Treasury from place to place staying always just ahead of Japanese
patrols who were searching for him.
After being driven out of, Misamis Occidental the
headquarters of the 10th Military District was relocated at Liangan, a barrio
of Kolumbugan in Lanao Province.
As time passed and the currency supply dwindled it
be- came obvious that steps would soon have to be taken to replenish it. Retreiving the presses from their hiding
place in the hills of Misamis Orcidental through Japanese patrolled areas to
Lanao presented enormous difficulties. The presses were made of cast iron and
had to be handled with caution to avoid breaking some vital part. Paper would have to be brought from as far
away as Zamboanga. Confronted with
these difficulties, Fertig came to the conclusion that it would solve a lot of
problems if the currency could be printed in Australia and sent in by
submarine. He suggested this possibility to MacArthurs, head quarters.
“Finances fifth August: We I have money to carry on
for thirty days. During that period I we will attempt to move printing presses
and plates thru enemy blockade to new safe location . . . . however an issue of
currency, to be printed in Australia
would solve, difficulty and present advantages: (a) same currency to be
used in all Military Districts (b) no shortage of material or skill to produce
currency to -defy local counterfeiting (c) sufficient small denominations,
could be provided (d) propaganda value of currency printed and delivered to
P.I. for express purpose of supporting the Commonwealth govt., civilian relief
and armed forces. Imperative that we be notified of your, decision in this
matter."
MacArthur’s staff recognized the validity of Fertigs
suggestions and began exploring the possibilities. Printed currency would take
up less space than printing supplies needed to produce a like amount, a
valuable consideration in respect to shipment by submarine. Should enough be
printed for all, where could it be printed?
Would the Australian government be receptive to the idea of having the
State printer do the work? Should
regular Philippine currency be used, suitably overprinted as was already being
done in printing HAWAII on U.S. currency for use in the Pacific. President Quezon would have to give his approval
as only he had the power to authorize such work, but it was anticipated that
his approval would readily be granted.
What was not anticipated was
MacArthur's reaction. When the various proposals were put before him for his
decision and approval, they were flatly rejected. MacArthur was not about to
get involved in printing currency for the guerrillas. Printing supplies yes, printed currency no Fertig was advised.
“Printing of currency here repeat
not considered practical. Every effort
will be made to keep you supplied with materials.
Fertig had expected his proposal
would be accepted. Stunned he realized
that if they were going to get any more currency they would have to print it
themselves. Sam Wilson was, assigned the difficult task of retrieving the press
equipment and some how getting it to Liangan.
It took 10 days, due to heavy rains to move the
press equipment from the hills down to a coast of Misamis Occidental . It was
moved in three bancas across Iligan Bay at night in a drizzling rain, which
helped to conceal the movement from any Japanese patrol craft that might be
snooping around. Another, week was
required to move it from the coast of Lanao inland to Iligan.
In the meantime the key press personnel had been
rounded up. New cuts of seals and
facsimile signatures had been prepared as well as new bo__ cuts for the five
peso notes which the originals had somehow gone astray. (They were later recovered, but were not at
Liangan.) A native shack in a cornfield
near Liangan was reconditioned to house both printing plant and press
personnel. Members of the Currency Board and their Representatives were
scattered far and wide and efforts to contact them had been unsuccessful. The urgency of the situation necessitated
that printing operations get underway immediately, so the printing operations
proceeded without them. Mr. Ubaldo D.
Laya, a member of the previous Mindanao Emergency Currency Board, had managed
to escape from the Japanese, and at Fertig's request came to Liangan to lend a
hand. He was forthwith appointed
Executive Secretary of the M.E.C.B. and placed in charge of the printing
operation.
Printing operations got underway 6 September 1943.
All small stock of white bond paper had arrived by submarine, but as the supply
was- limited, it was used to print only the 2, 5, 10 and 20 peso notes. All
other denominations were printed on brown wrapping paper. Countersigning of the
peso denominations was dispensed with.
Not only was it a time consuming chore, but none of the officials
authorized to do the signing were available to do so. As the log books and records of the Matugas printing were in the
possession of the absent members of the Currency Board, there was no record
available of the serial numbers previously printing. To avoid any possibility
of duplication of serial numbers, the numbering would start over again with
00001 and the serial numbers would be doubled. Formerly "A" to
"I", they were now to be "AA" to "II". There are
also unintentional minor variations in the handset type on all of the
denominations, and of course, the new border cuts- for the five peso note
varied some what from the previous cuts.
Friction soon developed between the owner of the
presses and the supervisory personnel representing the M.E.C.B. Considering the
difficulty under which the notes were printed, this is hardly surprising. At one time all but one or two of the
employees were suffering from either malaria or influenza and the place more
resembled a hospital than a printing establishment. Notes were misprinted, miss
cut and serial numbers duplicated resulting in wastage and delays. Bacarro complained of insufficient payment
causing him a financial loss; The price per thousand notes was increased, but
Bacarro still considered it too little. Sam Wilson was impatient with the
delays and wastage of precious supplies.
No doubt there was, ample cause for complaint on both sides. But instead of improving, relations
worsened. Finally Wilson's patience came to an end. On 28 October he commandeered the presses and put the press
personnel on the payroll of the M.E.C.B. bringing to an end the dual management
and control. Four days later the paper
supply became exhausted and printing came to a halt.
Coincidentally, enemy activity in the area intensified. Five enemy transports were reported
unloading troops in Iligan Bay. The
situation became a bit precarious and Fertig decided to move the headquarters
and the mint into the interior of Agusan province, somewhere along the Agusan
River which would permit water transport of supplies. The presses were dismantled, crated and moved to Liangan ready
for further movement to the coast should transport arrive in time or into the
mountains should the Japanese arrive first.
Each of the two presses weighed in the neighborhood
of a ton each. It would be an impossibility to move them over the mountain
ranges streams and rivers that lay between Liangan and the Agusan River.
Movement would have to be by, water.
As the cargo submarine USS NARWHAL was scheduled to
arrive at Nasipit, Agusan with 92 tons of supplies around the middle of
November Fertig got the idea that after unloading the supplies the submarine
could easily come into Iligan Bay, pick up the presses and move them to
Nasipit. Off went a radio message to
MacArthur requesting use of the submarine for that purpose. The request was disapproved. MacArthur wasn’t about to risk the loss
of-the only submarine then available to him on such a venture.
For four weeks the presses and press
personnel remained waiting at Liangan expecting the Jap’s to appear at any
time. Finally, on 28 November, a
motorized banca part of Fertig’s "navy" arrived to move the
presses. It was barely large enough for
the presses and a few key personnel.
The others were left behind.
Moving along the coast by night and hiding by day, they reached .Nasipit
where they transferred to other craft for the river passage. They finally arrived at Fertig's new headquarters
at Esperanza on 7 December.
In the meantime the USS NAITWHAL had
delivered the supplies at Nasipit on the night of 15 November. Among the printing supplies were 30 boxes of
paper, 27 cans of ink and dryer, assorted press equipment and 84 zink coated
bronze plates for printing currency.
The plates for the 2, 5 and 10 peso notes were almost identical to the
Matugas printing. The Plates for the other denominations differed considerably
in border designs. No doubt some of the guerrilla notes taken to Australia by
Charles Smith and “Chick" Parsons when they returned on the USS TROUT were
used in preparing the plates.
During the sea passage the press equipment had
gotten wet from the sea water and was already beginning to rust. Several days were required to clean the
equipment and put it in good working condition. While this was being done new
personnel were recruited to replace the people left behind, and given some
instruction in their new jobs.
Printing,
operations got underway again on 13 December 1943, using the metal plates
brought from Australia. As there were
no metal plates for the five centavo and twenty peso denominations these were
printed from the same type and cuts as before.
All denominations were now printed on white paper. Serial numbering
continued from where the Liangan printing had left off. The "double" serial letters were
continued, although the type size varied.
Some denominations were printed with both “wide" and
"narrow" serial letters.
However, distinguishing between the notes printed at Liangan and those.
printed at Esperanza is really quite simple.
The 5, 10, 20, and 50 centavo notes and the 1 peso note were all printed
on brown wrapping paper at Liangan, on white bond paper at Esperanza. There
were 68,000 notes of the 2, 5 and 10 peso notes printed at Liangan. Notes with
serial numbers higher than that figure are the Esperanza printing. Comparison will also disclose several minor
differences between the two printings. The 20 peso notes were printed from the
same type and cuts at both places and can be distinguished only by the serial
numbers. As 69,000 notes were printed
at Liangan, any note. with a higher serial number was: printed at Esperanza.
On
23 January 1944 the paper supplies received from Australia were exhausted and
printing operations ceased. As
intelligence from Surigao reported a buildup of Japanese troops at Liangan for
an invasion of Agusan, it was decided to move the "mint" even further
into the Interior. The site selected
was the town of Loreto on the Umayan River, a tributary of the Agusan. The presses were crated and the movement
began by barge on 31 January. On 2
February the barge ran aground in the river about one kilometer below Loreto.
It took six more days of hard work, employing caraboas and cargadores, to move
the heavy equipment into town
Part 3
Moving the presses used in printing the Mindanao "guerrilia"
currency from Esperanza, to Loreto, Agusan province was to afford the
"mint" better protection during an expected ;Japanese re-invasion. It
did not solve the problem of the shortage of paper which had brought printing
operations to a halt. By the middle of
February the. presses had been cleaned, reassembled and readied for operation.
But it was another month before a new supply of paper could be brought in and
printing operations resumed. The new
paper supply arrived from Australia on the USS Narwhal which unloaded 70 ,tons
of supplies at the mouth of the Agusan River on the night of March 2. Another two weeks were required to move the
paper up the Agusan and Umayen rivers to Loreto. Printing operations at Loreto got underway on March 18,
1944. As this printing would show the
change in date from 1943 to 1944, it was decided to begin the serial numbers
with 00001 and to resume the single, instead of double, series letters. As the
metal plates brought from Australia were used it was necessary to alter them by
routing out the old "Series 1943" date. The new "Series 1944" date was printed from available
printer's type. The shortage of type
resulted in some variation depending upon which denominations were being
printed simultaneously -on each of the two presses. Thus the 10 and -20 centavo notes were both printed with lower
case "Series 1944" and upper case "SERIES 1944." The 50 centavo, 2, 5 and 10 peso notes were
printed with the date "1944" in both "narrow" and
"wide" type styles. All 1
peso motes seen by the author have lower case "Series" and narrow
style type in the date. There were no
metal plates for the 5 centavo and 20 peso denominations. The printing of the 5 centavo was from the
same type as previous printings with the simple substitution of a "4
" for a "3 " in the date. No 20 peso notes were printed at
Loreto.
The remoteness of loreto did, as
expected, protect the “mint" during the Japanese re-invasion of
Agusan. Never were the Japanese soldiers
able to penetrate that far inland.
Nasipit and other coastal towns were occupied, and the Japanese forces
moved up the Agusan River to garrison Butum.
From there strong patrols moved even further inland along the
river. Almost daily and often twice daily
flights of bombers flew up the river valley system bombing towns along the
way. No longer was the river a highway
for the movement of guerrilla supplies from the cost to the interior.
Esperanza, Fertig's former headquarters was reduced rubble Talocogan, where his
heaaquaters had been relocated came under attack. Fertig prudently moved his headquarters to Waloe, even further up
the Umayan River than the "mint" at Loreto.
The coastal towns of Surigao were
either occupied by Japanese or patrolled by Japanese naval craft. No longer could supplies be moved into
Augusan from the Surigao coast and a scheduled submarine rendezvous in that
area had to be cancelled. From Davao long a Japanese stronghold came
still more bad news. Intelligence
reports indicated the Japanese were building up their forces at the headwater
of Agusan for a movement down that river into the interior of Agasan province.
The inaccessibility of the interior of Agusan which
had made it so desirable from a standpoint of security, now, turned the area
into a trap. As the Japanese moose tightened the supply situation
worsened. Even in the best of times the
area barely could produced enough for its regular population. There was little
to spare for the: military and press personnel. Supplies could only be brought in over the narrow mountain trails
across Bukidnon, carried on the backs of men who served as cargadores. The
routes were long and arduous. As the cargadores had also to carry with
them their supplies the net delivery was often but a fraction of the load with
which they had started out.
The
stock of paper for the "mint" continued to dwindle. The closest place from which new stocks
could be obtained was Zamboanga, and by the time it reached the
"mint" it, would probably be unusable for the presses. The obvious
solution was to print currency where supplies were available. But the heavy presses, even dismantled,
could not be moved over the mountain trails and transport by water was blocked
by Japanese control of the. lower part of the Agusan river.
Once
again Sam Wilson came, up with a solution. There was a printing press in
Dipolog Zamboanga, owned by the Rev Angel Soto, a Protestant minister. In fact it was this same press that had been
used in May, 1942, to print the currency issued by the Zamboanga Currency
Committee. Wilson with key press
personnel, could. travel overland to Zamboanga, and continue the printing of
currency there, using the press of the Rev. Soto. While preparations for this were, getting underway, the Japanese
bombed Loreto.
The
attack took place on July 5, 1944. One bomb destroyed the quarters of the mint personnel, another destroyed a house in
front of the office building.
Fortunately, both buildings were vacant at the time. Other bombs fell harmlessly further
away. While no one was injured, the
attack had, considerable demoralizing effect.
This was further aggravated by persistent rumors that the enemy was
rapidly closing in from both the upper and lower Agusan, as well as from
Surigao. As-further air attacks. could
be expected, it was decided to close down the "mint." The presses were dismantles crated. and
moved into the hills where they were hidden far off beaten trails. Important
records, printing
plates
and supplies of paper and ink were packed, water proofed and buried. On July 27 Ubaldo D. Laya and the press
personnel evacuated Loreto taking with them the printed currency on hand,
amounting to 269,210.40 pesos. They
moved further into the interior to the small town of Johnson, where they waited
further developments.
In the meantime, Sam Wilson with two printing
technicians, Meliton D. Apao and Francisco Teves, Jr., had already taken the
long trek to Zamboanga. They carried with them such printing equipment as they
could including sufficient "cuts" with which to print a full range of
currency. They traveled up the Umayani River to Pagatpatan, where they began
the long trek the mountain ranges of Bukidnon and Misemis 0riental. On reaching the coast they were able to
obtain transportation by small-bancas along the coasts of Misamis Oriental,
Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga. The
trip took the better part of two months and it was early September when they
finally reached their destination.
By a fortiuous circumstance all three members of the
Mindanao Emergency Currency Board -- Judge Saguin, Treasurer Pacana and Auditor
Barbasa were in Zamboanga at that
time. Treasurer Pacana having just
arrived from Misamis Occidental met Wilson at the home of Judge Saguin. A
meeting on the M.E.C.B. was arranged, which took place at Planco, a
barrio of Dipolog, an Sept., 9. At this
meeting the printing of currency in Zamboanga was authorized, and Resolution
No.16 was approved. This Regulation appointed Pacana as Executive, Secretary,
concurrently with his other duties making him responsible for the supervision
of the "mint" and accountable for all the currencies printed.
Rev. Soto readily consented to the use of his press,
which was set up on the ground floor of the warehouse in the sitio of Tookan
barrio of Tingkugas municipality of Dipolog.
The upper floor provided quarters for press personnel. A small house nearby became the quarters of
Pacana in which was installed a safe for the protection of the printed currency
pending its distribution. A squad of 15
soldiers under command of a lieutenant provided security for the operation of
the “mint."
Printing operations got underway on
Sept. 14, 1944. Due to the urgent need
for currency the printing of larger denominations took precedence. No 5 or 10 centavo notes were printed at
all, and only 15 of the 20 centavos denominations, Two different “cuts” were used in printing the __ peso notes,
which are readily identifiable by differences in completeness of the border and
in the style of type for the year date.
Said numbering began with 00__ to distinguish this
printing from previous ones the first “block” of 99,000 notes of each
denomination printed have no series letters, as did the previous printings. So
numbering would then serve again as they bad ___ 5 digit numbering ma___ and
subsequent ___ would each have a ___ letter or number ___ from any used previously. Due to
circumstances beyond the control of the _.E.C.B., this printing would take
place during three separate periods at different locations. Because of this,
and __ that there was no possibility of duplication, additional “blocks"
wound up with ___an one series desig___ planned, which has remained in
considerable con___ since. The M.E.C.B.
the subsequent printings at two other locations ___ the continuation of the
printing begun at Tingkugas. ___ reason
"Series 1944" ___ on all notes, even __ later printings took ___
1945.
Printing at Tingkugas came to an end on Oct. 6,
1944, when the available supply of paper was exhausted. As no further paper stocks were obtainable
locally, or expected to be delivered by submarine for some time, F.D. Pacana
settled all outstanding obligations- incurred by the "mint" returned
the press to Rev. Soto and paid off all employees except the two technicians
who had come from Agusan. Pacana kept
these two key men with him in order that they would be immediately, available
when printing operations could be resumed.
I will go into more detail regarding
the subsequent printings under Pacana further on, but in order to keep events
in a chronological order, let us now return to the "mint" at Loreto
in Agusan province.
The supply of currency previously
printed at Loreto having become exhausted, and the Japanese threat having
abated, instructions were issued to resume the printing of currency. Ubaldo D. Laya and the press personnel
returned to Loreto on Oct. 24, 1944. As
soon ass soon as the presses could again be assembled and the buried supplies
retrieved, printing was resumed. As
this was but a continuation of the printing brought to a halt the previous
July, serial numbering continued from where it had previously left off. Printing operations got underway on 4
November but were brought to a halt around the middle of the month on orders
received from Col. Fertig. MacArthur
had returned to the Philippines
American liberation forces had landed at Leyte on
Oct 20, bringing with them the new VICTORY currency which was placed under a
Proclamation issued by Gen. MacArthur.
Col Fertig expected that this
currency would be sent to Mindanao in as much as the guerrilla forces had
officially been recognized by MaeArthur as part of the U.S. military
forces. Accordingly, Fertig wired
MacArthur on Nov. 26:
“No further emergency currency will
be printed as we understand you will supply our needs with the new Victory
currency.”
This was followed up in another message in which
Fertig requested 600,000 pesos monthly for western Mindanao delivery to F.D.
Pacann and 700,GW pesos monthly for eastern Mindanao (delivery to Ubaldo D.
Laya). The requested amount included
500,000 pesos monthly for the operation of the free civil governments.
The request was ignored. MacArthur had no intention of: financing the guerrilla forces with
U.S. Army funds. He was perfectly
content for that burden to be shouldered by the Commonwealth government.
Finally, after repeated requests, for funds in which Fertig emphasized the
urgency of the situation. MacArthur on
Dec.' 22, curtly replied: “No provision has been made to substitute Victory
pesos for local emergency currency, until the respective areas come within the
perimeter of our operation."
Stunned, Fertig realized that as far as Mindanao was
concerned, the U.S. Army was just as remote as it had been before the Leyte
landing took place. If the 10th
Military District was to have the necessary currency to finance operations,
they would have to print it themselves.
To do so they would need paper.
Fertig therefore radioed MacArthur requesting that 150 reams of paper be
delivered monthly to -F.D. Pacana in Zamboanga and 60 reams monthly for Ubaldo
D. Laya in Agusan.
Since there was still a small stock of paper at
Loreto. Fertig instructed Ubaldo D.
Laya to resume printing of
currency. This printing got underway an
Jan. 2, 1945. The same plates -were
used as in the previous printing except that the year date was changed from
"1944" to "1945".
Serial numbering started with 000001, and thus all notes have six-digit
serial numbers. Theoretically, the
same minor variations in type in "Series
1945" could occur, as the same plates were used, but due to the small
amount printed this is unlikely to have occurred in all denominations. The only
one I have noticed is "'Series" and "SERIES" on the 10 centavo
notes. On Jan. 15, the supply of paper ran out and printing operations ceased.
As no additional supplies of paper were ever received, this terminated the
printing of currency in eastern Mindanao.
Apparently MacArthur's headquarters did not function
as smoothly as one would expect. On
Jan. 6, 1945, Fertig, receved a radio message asking him for the dimensions of
the paper he needed. Since MacArthur
had been supplying Fertig with paper to print currency since 1943, new
personnel must have been handling things.
Fertig promptly answered, and emphasized that 100% rag bond paper was
needed. time passed, and nothing further was heard about the paper. The, need grew increasingly urgent. On Jan. 21, Fertig radioed a reminder.
"Paper for printing currency, has not been
received. Our, payroll is now three
months behind and it is difficult to explain that we have no funds when Leyte
is land of plenty."
That, at least, got a reply:
"No paper for currency available in Leyte. Some is on order from Brisbane."
At the time those messages were exchanged, the paper
had already arrived. It was part of the
45 tons of supplies unloaded at Pagadian Bay by the USS Nautilus on the night
of Jan. 20. It took some time for it to
be transported overland to Dipolog.
F. D. Pacana, who had returned to Misamis Occidental
and resumed his duties as Provincial Treasurer, was contacted and instructed to
return to Zamboanga to resume his duties there as Executive Secretary of the
M.E.C.B. He made the trip in a small banca,
Accompanied
by the two printing technicians, arriving at Dipolog the first week in
February.
The press of the Rev. Soto was again
obtained, and set up in the Public School building in the barrio of Estaka,
municipality of Dipolog. Printing was resumed on Feb. 27, 1945. A squad of soldiers were assigned to the
“mint" for security.
On March 8 the first elements of
American liberation forces arrive in Mindanao landing at the Dipolog air strip
on C-46 transport planes. This
consisted of two companies of the __ Infantry, 24th Division to strengthen the
guerrilla garrison. The same day, 16
Coursairs of Marine Air Group 12 began to use the airstrip as their operational
base. The Corsairs provided air cover
for the amphibious assault force which was even then leaving L___d Mindoro and
which landed unopposed at Zamboanga on March 10.
The American landing in Zamboanga stirred to action
the Japanese forces in western Mindanao who had previously been content to
remain in their garrison strongholds where they felt much safer from guerrilla
attack. On March 25, Japanese troops
were observed in mountains near Dipolog, and it was expected that attack might
be imminent. Two guerrilla officers visited Pacana suggesting that the "mint"
___ated to to a more secure ___d said they had a sail boat available if
needed. As they had on hand over a
million pasos in newly printed currency for which he alone was responsible he
lost no time in following their suggestion. As ___ the selection of a new ___
the “mint” entirely up to the his discretion.
Pacana elected to return to his home providence Misamis Occidental.
Printing was resumed April __ 1944 in a rented
two-story, __ the barrio of Calamba, principality of Occidental. The __ floor housed the printing operations
while the second floor became the quarters of ___ and the press personnel. Only three soldiers were available for guard
duty.
On April 22 orders were received
from Col. Fertig to stop printing and await further instructions. Finally, on
May 15, 1945, Fertig ordered that no further printing was to be undertaken,
thus bringing to an end the printing of currency under the authority granted by
President Quezon to the second Mindanao Emergency Currency Board, under the
Chairmanship of Judge Florentino Saguin.-
The following series designations
were used for the printings under F.D. Pacana as Executive Secretary of the
M.E.C.B.:
|
.20
(none) |
15,000
notes |
|
.50
(none) and "5" |
71,800
notes |
|
1.00
(none) |
99,000
notes |
|
1.00"V"and"V5" |
57,700
notes |
|
2.00
(none) and "5" |
86,600
notes |
|
5.00
(none) and "5" |
99,000
notes |
|
5.00
"T"and"TS" |
88,600
notes |
|
10.00
(none) and "5 " |
99,000
notes |
|
10.00
"S"and"S5" |
99,000
notes |
|
10.00"SA5" |
4,200
notes |
|
20.00
(none) |
99,000
notes |
|
20.00"R"and"RS" |
99,000
notes |
|
20.00"RA5" |
70,300
notes |
Perhaps it will also be of interest
to. the reader if we here give a brief resume of the various printings of the
second M.E.C.B.
First
Printing: Matugas, Jiminez, Misaniis
Occidental; April 5 to June 25, 1943, Series 1943; 2.721,520 pesos.
Second
Printing: Uangan, Kolumbugan, Lanao;
Sept. 6 to Nov. 1, 1943; Series 1943;
2,689,400 pesos.
Third
Printing: EsMalLa, .Agusan. Dec. 13 1943 to Jan. .22, 1944, Series 1943; 4,970,630 pesos.
Fourth Printing: Loreto, Agusan: March 18 to July 5, and Nov. 4 to 15, 1944, Series 1944; 4,058,075pesos,
Fifth
Printing: Tookan, Ting. kugas, Zamboanga, Sept. 14 to Oct. 6, 1944; Estaka,
Dipolog, Zamboanga, Feb. 27 to March 25, 1945; Calamba. Plaridel, Misaniis
Occidental; April 1 to April 22. 1945; all Series 1944: 8,453,800 pesos.
Sixth
Printing: Loreto, Agusan, Jan. 2 to Jan. 15, 1945, Series 1945; 794,125 pesos.
All of the notes of the 1st
printing, as well as the 5, 10, 20, 60 centavo and 1 peso notes of the 2nd
printing were on brown wrapping paper, of various texture and thickness. In fact, some of the peso denominations of
the 1st printing are on paper so thick it is in reality a thin cardboard. All
other printings were on, white paper delivered by -submarine. While 100% rag
content bond paper was requested. most of the paper received was of inferior
quality, which Ubaido D. Laya referred to as "cheap book paper." The M.E.C.B. had no choice in the matter,
they had to use whatever they received.
Some of the paper was of a decent bond paper, but certainly not up to
the standard requested. It is -easily
distinguished from its inferior counterpart.
Some of this bond paper was watermarked "Linen Bond" in lower
case letters, or "Premier Bond" in -upper case letters. Portions of these watermarks! may be found
on some of the notes.
Of the 23,613,415.00 pesos printed
by the second Minidanao Emergency Currency Board, 2,283,171.35 was turned over
to the civil government, and 21,330,243.65 to the guerrilla force.
There were also several issues of
"local" currency in Cotabato, Bukidnon and, Zamboanga, which were
authorized by local guerrilla units. As
none of these, were issued with either the knowledge or approval of Col.
Fertig, Commanding, 10th Military District, they are outside the
scope of this article.
There is, however, one additional
type of currency whose use was authorized by Col. Fertig, and which is probably
unique.
In 1943 the puppet Philippine
government, at the urging of the Japanese military authorities, undertook the
redemption of emergency currency issued
prior
to the surrender of the USAFFE.
Regulations required that all notes turned in for redemption be stamped
with the date, name and title of the provincial or Municipal, Treasurer to whom
they were presented with an additional stamping in Japanese characters. For the most part the: stamping in Japanese
characters was not adhered to. But in
the providence of Lanao, the stamping in Japanese characters was prominently
done.
On Oct 8, 1944, guerilla: forces of
108th Division under command of Lt. Col. Charles W. Hedges. occupied, Dansalan
the capital Of Layisto province. The
Puppet Officials were captured along with the Treasury of the puppet
government. In the Treasury they found
62,000 pesos in pre surrender emergency currency; which had been redeemed, and
which bore the stampings in Japanese characters. Due to the critical shortage of currency at that time, Col Fertig
authorized the Provincial Treasure of the Free Provincial Government to use
this currency to meet necessary expenditures.
When the emergency and guerrilla
currencies were finally redeemed after the war – the guerrilla currencies at a
fraction of their farce value – those notes which had been stamped and redeemed
during the Japanese occupation by the puppet Philippine government were
specifically excluded.
Thus we have a unique "guerrilla currency that
was, (a) originally issued by authority of commonwealth President Manuel Quezon
prior to the. surrender the USAFFE. (b). redeemed by the Puppet Philippine
government under authority of M/Gen Yoshide Hayoshi, Director General of the
Japanese Military Administration, and stamped with the seals of Japanese
officials in Lanao, then issued by the Provincial insurer of the Free Lanao
Provincial Government under authority of Col Wendell W. Fertig USA, Commanding
the 10th Military District, and finally a repudiation by the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act. No. 369.
American liberation forces did not
land anywhere in Mindanao until March 1945 when when western Mindanao
(Zambanga) was liberated. It was another month before American forces began the
liberation of the rest of Mindanao with unopposed landings at Malabang and
Parang (Cotabato) in areas which the guerrillas had already secured. On June 30, 1945 the U.S. Army considered
Mindanao to be liberated and left the “mopping-up" to the guerrillas. Just how much “mopping up” remained to be
done is shown by the fact that the Guerrillas were in continuous combat until
Japan surrendered on August 14, after which 34,150 Japanese surrendered.
During this period the guerrilla’s and the free
civil governments were financed entirely by guerrilla currency. Yet during the
same period the U.S. Army refused to recognize the validity of the Mindanao
notes, which led to their steady depreciation.
On April 14, 1945 Col. Fertig radioed MacArthur:
"Continued expansion of areas under American
troops in Mindanao increases the, seriousness of the question of why require us
to use emergency currency while paying your areas with Victory notes. This is causing increased devaluation of
emergency notes."
This and subsequent protests were ignored. In the mountains the guerrillas fought on
receiving their partial pay in notes which were steadily depreciating in value.
In the American areas former collaborates rushed to obtain employment with the
American army for which they were paid in new Victory currency. There are many seamy sides to the American
liberation of the Philippines but perhaps the sorriest at all was the official
repudiation of MacArthur's headquarters of the guerrilla currencies. -MacArthur's
Allied Intelligence Bureau would later, boast of how little their intelligence
operations in the Philippines had cost, but would carefully omit any reference
as to how it was accomplished.
MacArthur's Intelligence Bureau did send Fertig by
submarine, $39,200 in U.S. currency, 625,000 pesos in Philippine Treasury
Certificates, and 1,650,000 pesos in counterfeit Japanese military (occupation)
notes. (The latter cost the U.S. Army
only the small cost of, printing them.)
As an example of how the Filipinos were rewarded for
their unswerving loyalty to -the States, I quote from a; letter written. by Mr.
Ubaldo D. Laya to Col. Fertig, Oct. 11.
"I deposited P21,001.25 and received only
P5,216.74. My deposit included the salary of my deceased son (3rd Lt Francisco
Laya), my salary and the proceeds of my products sold to our Tenth MD, USFIP,
consisting mostly of corn grain. After
waiting for four years, these notes are redeemed at 15%."
Col Fertig replied, "You and I must have been
on the wrong side. However, we can both
sleep peacefully since we do know that we did the right thing."
The author is deeply indebted to Col Fertig, Sam
Wilson, U. D. Laya and F. D. Pacana for an enormous amount of help in
researching the Mindanao currencies.
Col Fertig never did got the star of a Brigadier
General, which he certainly deserved.
After the war he returned to his home in Colorado where he became a
Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the Colorado School of Mines. After retirement he was appointed Director
of the Alunini Association.
A decade after the war he returned to Mindanao on
what he imagined would be a routine business trip. Instead, it became a triumphal procession with flags and banners
and welcoming committees in every city, town an barrio he visited or passed
through. From all over Mindanao the
people gathered to welcome the "General" who had led them during the
bitter years of the Japanese occupation.
Lt. Samuel J. Wilson (USNR) became Fertig's Chief of
Staff with the guerrilla rank of L/Col.
In November 1944, he was flown to layte at the request- of President
Osmena to serve as an advisor to the Commonwealth Government. He entered Manila with the American
liberation forces who liberated his wife and two sons from the Japanese
Internment Camp at Santo Tomas. After
the war he resumed his business in the Philippines until ill health
necessitated his retirement to California.
Some years ago the author corresponded with Capt.
Wilson (USNR, Ret.) who courteously assisted my research even though his health
was so poor that the letters were written by his wife. Because of this I
hesitated to impose further upon him and lost touch.
The author also corresponded for several years with
Ubaldo D. Laya and Filemino D. Pacana. Both served as Executive Secretary of
the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board (in addition to other duties), a title
that fails to convey the enormous responsibility imposed upon them. Their
responsibilities entailed everything from such mundane tasks as hiring of press
personnel arranging for kitchen staff and, food supplies, on up to being solely
responsible for the printing, safeguarding, distribution and accounting for the
Mindanao currency. They were also the
official representatives in Mindanao of the Common-, wealth Government, and
were so regarded by Col Fertig. To them
both I am indebted for the enormous amount of help they gave me, often at
considerable sacrifice. Both lived into
their eighties and were active, right up to the time they passed away, Mr. Laya
in 1974, Mr. Pacana last year (1977).
Left
& Right are front and back of the same bill, printed on available paper
Left
& Right are front and back of the same bill, printed on available paper
1000
peso Japanese note printed in Australia; US 10 cent Victory note printed in
Australia
Left
& Right are front and back of the same bill, printed on available paper